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Recent Cases
AGENCY-PRESUMPTION FROM NAME OF DEFENDANT ON TRUCK.
Ross v. St. Louis Dairy Co.'
Personal injury was inflicted on the plaintiff by the negligence of an alleged
agent of the St. Louis Dairy Co. The injury occurred when a truck driven by the
alleged agent collided with the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding. Inscribed
on the side of the truck was the name "St. Louis Dairy Co." The plaintiff brought
suit against the dairy company on the theory of respondeat superior. At the trial
the plaintiff presented evidence of the collision and the fact that the truck bore
the name of the Dairy Co. The defendant offered evidence that the driver of the
truck was the agent of an independent contractor, who was under contract with
the Dairy Co. to haul milk, and that defendant held no property interest in the
truck, but for advertising purposes had its name on the truck, together with the
name of the independent contractor.
At the close of all the evidence the trial court gave a peremptory instruction
directing a verdict for the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff took an involuntary
nonsuit, with leave to move to set the same aside. Plaintiff duly filed such motion
which was overruled and plaintiff appealed. Judgment was affirmed for defendant.
Appellant contends that the presentation of the evidence showing the name of
defendant was on the truck raised a presumption that the truck was being operated
by defendant through its agents, and made a prima facie case that could not be
taken from the jury regardless of defendant's evidence. The Missouri Supreme
Court held that such presumption does not entitle the plaintiff to go to the jury
in the face of strong rebutting evidence.
By prima facie case, or presumption, the courts usually mean that, without
more evidence, the party making out the same, is entitled to a verdict.2 (In cases
involving the situation presented in the instant case the courts seem to use the
term "prima facie" and the word "presumption" synonymously3) The apparent
conflict in the cases arises when the defendant introduces rebutting evidence which
to the satisfaction of the court overcomes the prima facie case, or presumption, and
still the plaintiff insists on going to the jury.
It is settled law in Missouri that a plaintiff who introduces evidence that the
name of the defendant was written on the vehicle that caused his injury, thereby
makes out a prima facie case of ownership of the vehicle and the agency of the
driver.,
1. 98 S. W. (2d) 717 (Mo. 1936).
2. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2490, 2494.
3. (1937) 2 Mo. L. REV. 100; (1936) 1 Mo. L. REV. 359.
4. Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215, 198 S. W. 854 (1917); O'Malley v. Heman
(213)
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There is a line of authority in Missouri to the effect that a prima facie case
once made out must go to the jury regardless of the conclusiveness of the defendant's
evidence. Under this authority the plaintiff argues that the credibility of the
defendant's witnesses is to be determined solely by the jury, and the court can not
take the case from the jury by directing a verdict.
The best authority for this propositon is the case of Barz v. Fleischmann Yeast
Co.5 This case, a four to three decision, held that a prima facie case once made
out can not be taken from the jury. Evidence offered by the defendant to over-
come the prima facie case must be presented to the jury, so that they may pass
on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. In
the case of Peterson v. Chicago & A. Ry., 6 which was cited as authority for the
holding in the Barz case, Judge Woodson said, "That is, after a prima facie case is
once made out, the case can never be taken from the jury." There are other cases
that could be cited as authority for this proposition outside the field of vicarious
liability.7
The Barz case as well as the Peterson case went too far in their holdings as to
the nature and effect of a prima facie case. What is called a prima facie case seems,
by later decisions, to be nothing more than a rule of procedure which requires a
case to go to the jury in the absence of rebutting evidence of such weight that
reasonable men would not draw different conclusions.
The court in the principal case has cleared up the uncertainty that arose from
the Barz case, at least as to instances where liability is predicated upon the master-
servant relation and where the existence of such relation rests upon a presumption.
S. PAUL KIMBRELL
BANKRUPTCY - VOLUNTARY PETITION IN ANTICIPATION OF DEVICE TO DEFEAT
CREDITORS.
In re Hall'
The Bankrupt, an heir under his father's will, filed his petition in bankruptcy
one hour and forty-five minutes before his father's death with full knowledge
of his father's impending death and with the obvious intention of preventing his
creditors reaching the expectant interest under the will. It was held that irres-
Construction Co., 255 Mo. 386, 164 S. W. 565 (1914); Veatch v. Tiernan, 251 S. W.
420 (Mo. App. 1923); Rockwell v. Standard Stamping Co., 210 Mo. App. 168, 241
S. W. 979 (1922); Fleishman v. Polar Wave Ice and Fuel Co., 148 Mo. App. 117,
127 S. W. 660 (1910).
5. 308 Mo. 288, 271 S. W. 361 (1925).
6. 265 Mo. 462, 178 S. W. 182 (1915).
7. Whittington v. Westport Hotel Operating Co., 326 Mo. 1117, 33 S. W.
(2d) 963 (1930); Gannon v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 145 Mo. 502, 46 S. W. 968
(1898); Kenny v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R., 80 Mo. 573 (1883); Davis v. Mis-
souri Electric Power Co., 88 S. W. (2d) 217 (Mo. App. 1935).
1. 16 F. Supp. 18 (W. D. Tenn. 1936).
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pective of the bankrupt's intent, his trustee in bankruptcy cannot reach the interest
acquired under the will as an asset of the estate.
The Bankruptcy Act provides that the trustee shall be vested with the title
of the bankrupt to "property which prior to the filing of the petition he [the
bankrupt] could by any means have transferred or might have been levied upon
and sold under judicial process aganist him." 2 Whether an expectant interest, then,
passes to the trustee in bankruptcy depends on whether or not such interest comes
within the above language. Some jurisdictions have adopted the view that the
expectant interest of a person under a will can be transferred, 3 thus bringing such
interest within the language of the Bankruptcy Act.4 An expectant interest has
been held to be transferable 4 by assignment,5 by sale," or by release,7 and it is
subject to execution.8 In these jurisdictions, the result of the case under considera-
tion might have been different. In many jurisdictions, however, an heir's expectant
interest is ordinarily not recognized as property that can be transferred or levied
upon. 9
The question then suggests itself whether an exception can be made where, as
here, the petition was filed for the very purpose of keeping the interest under the
will away from the trustee. True, as the court expressly said, "the statute makes no
provision for exceptional instances based on bad motive or fraudulent intent of the
bankrupt in filing a petition." But if the court believes that such a practice by
bankrupts is fraudulent and should be prevented, is it helpless to do any thing about
it? Logically, "the Act must be construed, if the language reasonably permits such
a construction to avoid an interpetation which permits a dishonest or tricky debtor
to escape its provisions."1x It does not seem to be asking too much that the petition
in bankruptcy be filed in good faith. The courts have read into the Bankruptcy
Act the requirement of good faith on the part of the bankrupt in a number of
situations where that element is not provided for in the letter of the Act. It has
2. BANKRUPTcy AcT, § 70 a (5); 11 U. S. C. A. § 110 (a) (5).
3. Moore v. Little, 41 N. Y. 66 (1869); National Park Bank of N. Y. v. Bil-
lings, 203 N. Y. 556, 96 N. E. 1122 (1911); Clowe v. Seavey, 208 N. Y. 496, 102
N. E. 521 (1913). See Note (1925) COL. L. R. 215, 216.
4. Reilly v. Makenzie, 151 Md. 216, 134 Atl. 502 (1926); Watkins v. Biglow,
93 Minn. 361, 101 N. W. 497 (1904); Simpson v. Miller, 7 Cal. App. 248, 94 Pac. 252
(1907); Clarke v. Fay, 205 Mass. 228, 91 N. E. 328 (1910); Clowe v. Seavey, 208
N. Y. 496, 102 N. E. 521 (1913).
5. Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 126 Pac. 149 (1912).
6. Gary v. Newton, 201 Ill. 170, 66 N. E. 267 (1903); Hudson v. Hudson,
222 Ill. 527, 78 N. E. 917 (1906).
7. Bolin v. Bolin, 245 Ill. 613, 92 N. E. 530 (1910); Simmons v. Ross, 270
Ill. 372, 110 N. E. 507 (1915); Edler v. Frazier, 174 Iowa 46, 156 N. W. 182 (1916);
Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S. C. 264, 84 S. E. 233 (1914).
8. Eneberg v. Carter, 98 Mo. 647, 12 S. W. 522 (1889); Williams v. Lobban,
206 Mo. 399, 104 S. W. 58 (1907); Higgins v. Downs, 91 N. Y. Supp. 937 (1905);
see Mantz v. Kistler, 221 Pa. 142, 70 Atl. 545 (1908).
9. 7 C. J. 119; see Note (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 272; (1927) 48 A. L .R. 795.
10. See Hills v. F. D. McKinniss Co., 188 Fed. 1012 (N. D. Ohio 1910).
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been held that a bankruptcy court will not hear a petition of one who had acquired
a residence in a jurisdiction other than his bona fide one with the intent of defeating
his creditors by claiming the higher exemptions at the forum.". Likewise, the courts
have avoided preferences made more than four months prior to the filing of the
petition where the bankrupt had delayed the filing of the petition with the sole
motive of perfecting the preference and thus defeating other creditors.' 2
It would not then be a radical departure from bankruptcy principles to require
good faith in the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.' 3 If so, a court ought to reach
a different result from that of the case under consideration when it is reasonably
clear that the petition was filed solely to keep the expectancy away from creditors.' 4
M. A. CORNELL, JR., '37
BILLS AND NOTES-TIME OF PRESENTMENT OF LOCAL CHECK TO HOLD DRAWER.
Farm & Home Savings & Loan Ass'n of Mo. v. Stubbs'
This was an action on a note, to which the defense was payment by check
which was accepted by the agent of the plaintiff. The check was delivered to the
agent on Friday at 1:45 p. m. and indorsed by her with the name of the payee,
plaintiff, and delivered to a depository bank for collection on Saturday morning but
too late on that day to be cleared by the clearing house, which had met at ten a. m.
On the morning of the following Monday the drawee bank failed to open for business;
the check never was presented. The agent and the drawee bank were located in the
same town. Held, the check operated as payment of the note. The court said
that where a check is delivered by the drawer to the payee in the same city where
the bank on which it is drawn is located, reasonable time for its presentment, where
no cause for delay appears, is within banking hours on the day of its delivery or on
the next day after its delivery. Section 2814 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri,
which discharges the drawer if an unreasonable time elapses, and section 2824 of the
Revised Statutes, which states that the nature of the instrument, the circumstances,
and the usage of trade and business are to be taken into consideration, were so
construed. The court pointed out that section 557 of the Revised Statutes (Uniform
Bank Collection Code), which gave the collecting bank until the day after deposit
of a local check to present it to the drawee, applied only as between the depositor
and the collecting bank and had no effect on the drawer of the check.
11. In re Garneau, 127 Fed. 677 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904).
12. In re Spelman. Bank of Sturgeon v. Stewart, 13 F. (2d) 645 (W. D. Mo.
1926).
13. See Note (1931) 29 MicH. L. R. 915, 920.
14. In accord with the instant case, see In re Seal, 261 Fed. 112 (E. D. N. Y.
1919).
1. 98 S. W. (2d) 320 (Mo. App. 1936).
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While it appears on the face of these facts that the plaintiff had two days and
part of a third within which to present this check, the exact day on which this
transaction occurred should be noticed carefully. The third day, Sunday, cannot be
considered as part of that time which is reasonable, either at common law or under
the Negotiable Instruments Law, which provides that when the last day for doing
any act required by that statute falls on Sunday the following secular day will
suffice.2 That leaves Saturday and part of Friday, at best a day and a half. It
may quite legitimately be doubted whether Saturday should be included. The
Missouri statute says of instruments "falling due or becoming payable" on Saturday
that they may be presented for payment on the following business day.3 This is
a departure from the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, section 85, which says
that paper falling due Saturday is to be presented on Monday, except demand
paper which may at the option of the holder be presented on Saturday morning.
It is arguable that the check here was an instrument "falling due or becoming
payable" on Saturday; indeed the language of the court was to that effect, so it
would seem from the statute that presentment the following Monday might suffice.
This reasoning is also somewhat supported by the remainder of that same statute
which says that if payment of a check is made on Saturday it would not be invalid.
That language is permissive, giving grounds to an inference that it is optional with
the holder whether to present the check on Saturday or Monday. On the basis of that
interpretation the holder ought not be penalized for not exercising his option
affirmatively. A possible interpretation, and one which would not clash with the
holding in the principle case, would be that since the statute does not specifically
mention demand paper, the statute is to refer to time paper only. The weakness
in that is that the statute goes on specifically to say that checks may be presented
on Saturday.
The most important aspect of the case, however, is that the court refused to
allow a time for presentment which would give legal sanction to customary collection
by merchants in the ordinary and normal course of business. The holder here actually
deposited the check in his own bank the very next morning after he received it
from the drawer. It is frequently stated to be the general or even universal rule
that where the drawee and the payee and the drawer are in the same city, present-
ment, to be made in a proper time, must be made on the day of issue or at least
on the day after.4 But upon an examination of the cases it is discovered that
this may with more accuracy be termed universal dictum. The cases in which the
statement as above made is actually applicable are comparatively infrequent; the
delay is usually from five or six days up to years. And in those infrequent cases
where the rule would be applicable there is some difference of opinion. The majority
of the cases do make allowance for the ordinary usages of business men by permitting
2. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 2825.
3. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 2713.
4. 5 R. C. L. 509, § 32.
5
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the payee to deposit the check in a local bank for collection on the day after he
receives it and by permitting presentment to the drawee on the day after that.'
Only two cases contra have come to the writer's attention.6 Of course, even in the
majority of jurisdictions the extra day must be due solely to the collection feature;
mere circulation is not enough to extend the time, nor is a mere holding of the check
and subsequent delayed presentation. However, there are at least three cases where
the deposit for collection was made on the day following the issue but the present-
ment to the drawee did not occur until two days after, and this period was not held
to discharge the drawer.8 The opposite has been held where the payee holds the
check during all of the second day after receipt, deposits it for collection a third day,
and the bank presents it the day after that.9 The instant case has then added
itself to that very small minority that will not even take into consideration the
time necessary for collection through a clearing house system. The case is one
of first impression in Missouri, though the dictum has appeared before.' 0 The
question has not been decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri; and so it is not
impossible to conceive of an ultimate contrary rule in Missouri.
The actual basis for the haste required in the presentment of checks seems to be
rooted in a theory of negligence, or, perhaps more accurately, that the loss caused by
the unbusinesslike delay should in these commercial matters be borne by the delayer.
Now, where a holder of a check retains it for two or three days during which time
it could be discharged by the bank and then presents it after the bank has closed.
there would be grounds for considering this a delay for which he himself should
bear the loss, as between him and the drawer. But when a business man takes in
5. Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Goodman, 173 Ark. 489, 292 S. W. 659
(1927); McFadden Bros. Agency v. Keesee, 179 Ark. 510, 16 S. W. (2d) 994 (1929);
Bistline v. Benting, 39 Idaho 534, 228 Pac. 309 (1924); Clarke v. Davis, 48 Idaho
214, 281 Pac. 3 (1929); Johannsen v. Evans, 271 Ill. App. 372 (1933); Village of
Lombard v. Anderson & Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 280 Ill. App. 283 (1935); Md.
Title Guarantee Co. v. Alter, 167 Md. 244, 173 AtI. 200 (1934); Spencer v. Burakie-
wicz, 192 N. E. 616 (Mass. 1934); Bay City v. Concordia Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 260
Mich. 611, 245 N. W. 532 (1932); Zaloom v. Ganim, 72 Misc. 36, 129 N. Y. Supp.
85, aff'd, 148 App. Div. 892, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1151 (1911); Scott v. Board of Educ.
of Union Free Schools, 241 App. Div. 883, 272 N. Y. Supp. 20 (1934); Loland v.
Nelson, 8 P. (2d) 82 (Ore. 1932); Loux v. Fox, 171 Pa. 68, 33 Atl. 190 (1895);
Willis v. Finley, 173 Pa. 28, 34 At. 213 (1896).
6. Edmiston v. Herpolsheimer, 66 Neb. 94, 92 N. W. 138 (1901); Dorchester
v. Merchant's Nat. Bank of Houston, 106 Tex. 201, 163 S. W. 5 (1914).
7. Koch v. Sanford Loan & Realty Co., 220 Mo. App. 396, 286 S. W. 732
(1926); Sugnet v. Board of Educ. of Union Free Schools, 241 App. Div. 883, 272 N.
Y. Supp. 21 (1934); Hawks v. Board of Educ. of Union Free Schools, 241 App. Div.
880, 272 N. Y. Supp. 24 (1934).
8. Johannsen v. Evans, 271 Ill. App. 372 (1934); Scott v. Board of Educ. of
Union Schools, 241 App. Div. 883,272 N. Y. Supp. 20 (1934). Contra: Lowell Co-op.
Bank v. Sheridan, 287 Mass. 338, 188 N. E. 636 (1934).
9. Viles v. Warren Co., 132 Me. 277, 170 At. 501 (1934).
10. Koch v. Sanford Loan & Realty Co., 220 Mo. App. 396, 286 S. NV. 732
(1926).
6
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a number of checks on one day and on the following day deposits them for collection
in a customary fashion so that in the normal course presentment would usually be
made on the succeeding day, no unbusinesslike delay would seem to have occurred.1"
Mercantile law should adapt itself to legitimate business practices, rather than force
business practices into legal moulds.12 Law exists for business, not business for law.
PAUL F. NIEDNER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-APPLICATION OF GOLD LEGISLATION TO LEASES CONTAINING
"GOLD CLAUSES."
Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co.'
Between the years of 1881 and 1897 thirteen leases were executed by the Holyoke
Water Power Company to the American Writing Paper Company for the enjoy-
ment in perpetuity of water power rights and privileges in consideration of an annual
rental. With variations immaterial for present purposes, the provision for rental is
the same in all the leases. By concession the following form has been accepted as
typical: the grantee shall yield and pay unto the grantor as rent "a quantity of
gold which shall be equally in amount to fifteen hundred ($1,500) dollars of the gold
coin of the United States of the standard of weight and fineness of the year 1894, or
the equivalent of this commodity in United States currency." In June, 1934, the dollar
having been devalued [48 STAT. 337, 31 U. S. C. A. § 441 (1934)], and the Joint
Resolution having been adopted [48 STAT. 112 (1933)], the lessee became insolvent
and filed a petition in bankruptcy which was approved. The lessor intervened and
prayed that the amount due it under the several leases be determined. The lessee
contended that by force of the Joint Resolution, the debt was dischargeable, dollar
for dollar, in the then prevailing currency. The lessor did not deny that the law
declines to give effect to contracts whereby debts are made payable in gold coin, or
in currency varying with the gold basis of the dollar, but instead argued that the
11. One should be careful to distinguish between the discharge of a drawer
and the discharge of an indorser; the latter is only discharged if an unreasonable de-
lay occurs after the last negotiatzon. Section 2699 of the Revised Statutes of Mis-
souri so reads concerning a bill of exchange payable on demand, and by section 2813,
the provisions applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a check.
The corresponding sections of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law are respec-
tively sections 71 and 185.
12. Generally a check drawn on a bank in another place must be forwarded on
the day after receipt and presented to the drawee the day after arrival at the situs
of the drawee. Swift & Co. v. Miller, 62 Ind. App. 312, 113 N.E. 447 (1916). How-
ever, that time intervening will vary with the system of collection customary and it
is not always necessary that the check be sent by the shortest route if there is a
customary clearing system used. Sublette Exch. Bank v. Fitzgerald, 168 Ill. App. 240
(1912).
1. 57 Sup. Ct. 485 (1937).
7
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covenant here in question was not for the payment of a debt, but for the sale of a
commodity, or if viewed as a covenant for payment that the standard was the com-
modity value of bullion, not the value of the coin as money. The District court held
for the lessee and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. Upon certi-
orari the Supreme Court of the United States held the obligation was one for the
payment of money and not for the delivery of gold as upon the sale of a commodity.
The situation of the parties, their business needs, and expectations must be consid-
ered, in gauging their intention. The lessor was a water power company and thus
there could be no pretense that it was a stipulation for gold to be used in art or in
industry. The gold was a standard with which to stabilize the value of the dollar;
the dollar was not a yardstick with which to measure the quantity of the gold. A
contract for the payments of gold as the equivalent of money, and a fortiori a con-
tract for the payment of money measurable in gold, is within the letter of the Joint
Resolution and equally within its spirit. While it is true that the Joint Resolution
frustrates the expectation of the parties, that payment should be made in a standard
which would remain constant and is to this extent abortive; yet the disappointment
of expectations and the frustration of contracts may be a lawful exercise of power
when the expectation and contract are in conflict with public welfare.
This decision further clarifies the application of the Joint Resolution which was
dealt with in Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R.,2 and Perry v. United States.3
The foregoing cases having determined the constitutionality of the act, questions of
applicability remained to be determined.
It appears that Mr. Justice Cardozo has set up a criterion for determining
whether or not an obligation containing a "gold clause" is an obligation for the de-
livery of gold as a commodity, i.e. the sale of gold as a commodity, and thus exempt
from the Joint Resolution, or whether it was an obligation for the payment of money
and thus within the provisions of the resolution.4 The statement in the opinion, "We
must consider the situation of the parties, their business needs and expectations, in
gauging their intention," 5 followed by, "Weasel words will not avail to defeat the
triumph of intention when once the words are read in the setting of the whole trans-
action," 6 appears to be a particularly useful test in view of the susceptibility of "gold
2. 294 U. S. 240 (1935).
3. 294 U. S. 330 (1935).
4. Executive Order of Apr. 5, 1933, promulgated under Section 3 of the
Emergency Banking Relief Act, 48 STAT. 2, 12 U. S. C. A. § 248n (1933), requiring
possessors to deliver any gold held over the amount of $100 to Federal Reserve Banks.
This order permitted the holding and acquisition of gold only for use in art, industry,
rare coin collection, and for export, and provided for licensing transactions. This
was held valid in Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317, 328 (1935).
5. 57 S. Ct. 485, 488 (1937).
6. 57 S. Ct. 485, 488 (1937).
8
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clauses" to variations in phraseology.7 This type of interpretation is not without
precedent.8
Mr. Justice Cardozo interprets the intention of Congress as expressed in the
Joint Resolution 9 as including transactions whereby gold, coined or uncoined, is to
be delivered in satisfaction of a debt, payment and not a bona fide sale being the
end to be achieved, and also those obligations whereby the debt is dischargeable in
dollars varying in number with the gold basis of the currency. This would seem a
reasonable interpretation of the act, since the wording is "gold or a particular kind
of coin or currency of the United States." (Italics the writer's).
The effect of the decision then appears to be to limit the scope of the commodity
exception to the Joint Resolution, to those transactions wherein the parties intend a
bona fide sale of gold for art or industrial purposes; the intention of the parties when
inserting the clause to be governing at all times.
Relying upon the principal case for the proposition that the purpose of insertion
and not the wording of a "gold clause" is the determinative factor in testing the ap-
plicability of the Joint Resolution, it would seem that the recent case of Emery Bird
Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams'° would be governed by the principal case. The
"gold clause" provision in this lease, which was made in 1890, provided that rental
payments were to be made in currency during the first six years and after that in
quarter annual payments of 139,320 grains of pure gold. The lessors were given the
privilege, however, of demanding $6,000 in currency in lieu of gold. Currency had
been accepted by the lessor until 1933, at which time they demanded bullion or, in
the alternative, the payment of $10,185.75, which was the price the government was
then paying for newly-mined gold. The court held that the lease called for the de-
livery of a commodity and was therefore not affected by the Joint Resolution as it
7. The clause may provide for payment in an amount of gold measured in a
certain number of gold dollars of the weight and fineness of a certain year; or in a
number of gold dollars of the weight and fineness of a certain year; or in an amount
of currency determined upon the gold content of the dollar of a certain year; or it
may provide for payment in grains of gold of a certain fineness with an option in the
lessor of taking currency. All these expressions result in a hedging provision to guard
against depreciation of the dollar.
8. Bradley, J. in The Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 566 (1870).
9. The preamble to the Joint Resolution, 48 STAT. 112 (1933), states the de-
clared intention of Congress as follows: "provisions of obligations which purport to
give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or
currency of the United States measured thereby, obstruct the power of the Congress
to regulate the value of the money of the United States, and are inconsistent with
the declared policy of the Congress to maintain at all times the equal power of every
dollar, coined or issued by the United States, in the markets and in payment of
debts." The Resolution then provides that such obligations shall be discharged upon
payment dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is
legal tender for public and private debts. The term "obligation" is defined in Sub-
section (B) of the Resolution as an obligation payable in money of the United
States. (Italics the writer's).
10. 15 F. Supp. 938 (W. D. Mo. 1936).
9
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applied only to "money obligations;" that this was a contract for the delivery of
bullion and not gold coin and that limitations which inhere in the ownership of gold
coin do not inhere in the ownership of bullion any more than in other property. In
determining what would satisfy the lessee's obligation the court held that although
delivery of bullion was impossible, yet payment of $10,185.75 would satisfy the con-
tract requirement of payment in gold, since the lessors were interested in gold only
as a "symbol of value."
For the purpose of declaring the Joint Resolution inapplicable, Judge Otis con-
siders the "gold clause" as calling for the delivery of a commodity, but for the pur-
pose of determining the amount of rental to be paid by the lessee, states that the
"patent meaning" of the language of the clause was to regard gold as a "symbol of
value" in order to secure the lessor against depreciation in the value of the dollar. The
latter statement seems to be an admission that this was a money obligation measured
in terms of gold and not an obligation for the sale of gold as a commodity. These two
views are inconsistent. The former is vulnerable to the line of reasoning applied by
Mr. Justice Cardozo in the principal case and to common understanding. It is difficult
to conceive of the lessor being interested in gold as a commodity and not as money
in view of the fact that the lessor was not a dealer in gold or an artisan interested in
gold for commercial purposes but rather was a landlord interested in rental. Con-
sidering the position taken by the court to the effect that the parties were regarding
the gold as a "symbol of value" and were specifically contracting against the possi-
bility of depreciation by making the number of dollars measurable in terms of gold,
the clause falls precisely within the express terms of the Resolution according to Mr.
Justice Cardozo's interpretation and $6,000 dollars in the present currency should
discharge the lessee's quarterly rental.
In answering the lessees contention that the case of Perry v. United States is
governing, Judge Otis points out that that case dealt with gold coin and further
stated that no limitations inhere in the ownership of bullion which do not inhere in
the ownership of all property. In the portion of the opinion headed "Conclusion,""x
it is stated that when parties have contracted for the payment of rent in grains of
gold or their value and not in depreciated dollars, no judge, the President, or Congress
has the power to change this type of contract. In these two statements the court
overlooks the declaration of the Supreme Court in Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio
R. R.,12 where it was held that special significance attaches to the ownership of gold
and silver since it is the standard of our medium of exchange, that "Contracts may
create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject matter which lies
within the control of the Congress, they have a congenital infirmity."'1 The power
11. 15 F. Supp. 938, 946 (W. D. Mo. 1936).
12. 294 U. S. 240 (1935).
13. 294 U. S. 240, 307, 308 (1935).
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of Congress to enact laws for the purpose of protecting the monetary standard in the
interest of the general welfare has been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court.14
However much the abortive nature of the Joint Resolution may shock the ju-
dicial senses of those advocates of sanctity and strict construction of contracts, the
fact remains that the express intention of Congress being to make inoperative such
"gold clause" provisions in the interest of public welfare and the means chosen to
achieve this intention having been held a valid exercise of legislative power by the
Supreme Court,' 5 nothing remains to be done but to enforce it.
H. L. LISLE
CORPORATIONS-INFORMAL CORPORATE ACTION- DECLARATION OF DIVIDENDS.
Brown v. Luce Mfg. Co.'
The plaintiff entered into a contract of employment with the defendant cor-
poration, which contained a provision for the sale to the plaintiff by the defendant
of 100 shares of its stock, to be paid for out of dividends whch might be declared
thereon. The stock was not to be transferred to the plaintiff until thus paid for,
and, in the event that the employment terminated before that time, the company
agreed to pay the amount of such dividends to the plaintiff in cash. The corporation
was a family affair, Mrs. Luce and her two sons being the sole stockholders and
directors, and conformed only to such laws and regulations relative to the corporation
as was necessary to keep the charter alive. There was no formal meeting of the
board of directors during the time that the plaintiff was connected with the
defendant, but the affairs were discussed informally between the stockholders oc-
casionally; and one of the sons was in active charge of the company's business. He
authorized, at the end of one fiscal year, a credit to the plaintiff (and to one other
employee but not to stockholders generally) on the corporate books of 4% of the
net profits for that year. The company lost money in subsequent years and this
credit was removed. At the termination of the employment, the plaintiff's demand
for the sum, as a declared dividend, was refused, and he instituted this suit. The
court held that no particular formality was necessary for the declaration of a
dividend, the crediting of the stockholder on the books of the corporation with a
portion of the profits being sufficient to indicate a severance of the amount from the
assets of the corporation so as to become the sole and exclusive property of the
stockholder. The court found that the individual character of the credit and the
losses of the corporation in subsequent years were not controlling factors; and, in
14. The Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1870); Perry v. United States, 294
U. S. 330 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 294 U. S. 240 (1935).
15. Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 294 U. S. 240 (1935).
1. 96 S. W. (2d) 1098 (Mo. App. 1936).
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answering the contention of the corporation that the dividend, if any, had not been
authorized by the board of directors, said: "Of course, primarily the directors only
have power to declare a dividend but in the case at bar the directors turned over
their authority in respect to the functions of the corporation to its president who
declared the dividend (and it may be inferred that this was done with the acquies-
cence, if not the consent, of the only other active officer and director of the
company). Under such circumstances the dividend was properly declared by the
president."
This case clearly demonstrates the informal manner in which the internal affairs
of a family corporation are often managed. Mrs. Luce and her two sons had created
a corporation to conduct the business, with the advantages incident to such in-
corporation. But, as a practical matter, the mother took no active part in the
business and the sons operated it as their own private enterprise, one of them being
president and active manager. These three were the only stockholders and con-
stituted the necessary number of directors. But there were no meetings of the
directors as a board; the affairs of the corporation were discussed only informally
among the stockholder-directors from time to time, with authorization given the
president to exercise what powers the corporation possessed.
One question presented was whether there had been a "declaration" of a
dividend. It is well established that no part of the profits of a corporation amounts
to a dividend until in some manner set apart or designated to the use of the stock-
holders.2 Until then the profits are assets of the corporation as such and do not
belong to the individual stockholders. 3 It is also well settled that no particular for-
mality or phraseology in the declaration of a dividend is necessary.4 The crediting
of a stockholder on the books of the company with a portion of the profits indicates
such a "severance" of the amount from the assets of the company as to create a
debtor-creditor relation between corporation and stockholder. 5 Although a declared
dividend usually inures to the benefit of all the stockholders alike, with an
exception, of course, in the case of preferred stockholders, it may be for the benefit of
certain ones, if their distinctive position justifies such a preference.6 Such was clearly
the position of the plaintiff in this case. And if a dividend were actually declared,
the fact that the company lost money in subsequent years was not, without more,
a valid ground for withdrawing the dividend by cancellation of the credit.7
2. Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S. W. 91 (1927);
11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Rev. and Perm.
ed. by Jones, 1932) § 5319.
3. Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 (1890).
4. Hadley v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 36 F. (2d) 543 (App. D. C. 1929);
11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Rev. and Perm.
ed. by Jones, 1932) § 5350.
5. Spencer v. Lowe, 198 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912), note (1913) 26 HARv.
L. REV. 370.
6. Breslin v. Fries-Breslin Co., 70 N. J. L. 274, 58 Atl. 313 (1904).
7. McLaren v. Crescent Planing Mill Co., 117 Mo. App. 40, 93 S. W. 819
(1906).
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The seemingly most controversial point in the case, from the point of corporate
theory, is the manner in which the dividend was declared. Did the "corporation"
declare the dividend? Ordinarily the management of a corporation is placed in the
hands of the board of directors with the determination of dividend policy being
considered a matter peculiarly within their special province.8 And, as a general
rule, the directors must act as a board in a matter which requires director's action,
else it is often said that the "corporation" has not acted. Here the directors did not
act as a board, but what they did was acquiesced in by all the stockholders. This
dispenses with the real reason requiring board action. At this point, some would
argue that the stockholders are not the "corporation," relying on an alleged rule of
corporation law (which is really nothing more than a convenient legal jingle), viz:
a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders.9 That alleged
rule is not the legal force which really decides a controversy, and in fact courts
do not permit this concept to obscure their vision of the actualities involved in a
particular situation. 10 The court in the instant case reached a desirable result by
courageously throwing off the strictures of technicality and deciding that the
stockholders (they and the directors being identical) had either authorized, or
acquiesced in, the management of the corporation's affairs, including the matter of
declaration of the dividends by the president, and therefore the "corporation" had
acted. There could be no sound basis for releasing the corporation from the
obligations thus incurred. "Courts are not to shut their eyes to the realities of
business life. Here was a small corporation controlled by a single family. Its
business was run without formality. None the less it was run, and responsibility
must be centered somewhere."".
WARNER G. MAUPIN
CRIMINAL LAW-CRIME WITHOUT Mens Rea.
Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v. United States'
The Immigration Act 2 made it a duty of every person "bringing an alien to, or
providing a means for an alien to come to, the United States, to prevent the landing
8. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 4942; 14 C. J. 807.
9. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS (1936) c. 2.
10. Smith v. Moore, 199 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912); Wenban Estate v.
Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924); note (1925) 13 CALIF. L. REV. 235;
Barnes v. Spencer & Barnes Co., 162 Mich. 509, 127 N. W. 752 (1910); Jones v.
Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S. W. 486 (1897); Gerard v. Empire Square Realty Co., 195
App. Div. 244, 187 N. Y. Supp. 306 (1921); Moore v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
155 Va. 556, 155 S. E. 707 (1930); note (1931) 17 VA. L. REv. 516. All these are
cases of valid informal corporate action, though the reasoning is often couched in
"entity" language.
11. Per Cardozo, J., in Barkin Construction Co. v. Goodman, 221 N. Y. 156,
161,116 N. E. 770, 771 (1917).
1. 57 Sup. Ct. 356 (1937).
2. Immigration Act of 1917, sec. 10(a), as amended, 8 U. S. C. A. sec. 146(a).
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of such alien in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by
the immigration officers." Failure to comply constitutes a misdemeanor punishable
by fine or imprisonment or both. At the option of the Secretary of Labor a fine of
$1,000 may be imposed and a lien upon the vessel may be created for which it
shall be libeled.
The Santos Maru came into the port of New Orleans carrying an alien passenger,
who was enroute from Brazil to Japan, on a through ticket. A written order was
issued to the steamship to hold the alien on board at all United States ports. A
few days later, the ship arrived at the port of Galveston, Texas; and there by the
negligence of those in charge of the ship the alien passenger was allowed to escape
and land in the United States. A libel was filed in behalf of the United States,
praying a decree for the $1,000 penalty and to enforce the lien against the ship. A
decree was elitered for the United States. The Supreme Court held that when a
ship enters a United States port with a passenger on board that passenger has been
brought to the United States. The court thought this was the only possible con-
struction of the statute and therefore it was immaterial whether or not there was
an intent to leave the alien in the United States.3
The concept that there can be a crime in the absence of any criminal intent or
mens rea has grown up rapidly in recent years. In earlier times courts and writers
often declared that there could be no crime without criminal intent.4 Since these
declarations many statutory crimes have been created which are silent as to intent.
Some of these the courts have interpreted as requiring no criminal intent or mens tea.
The court in Commonwealtit v. Raymond 5 said, "The defendant is bound to know
the facts and obey the law at his peril." In nearly all jurisdictions the courts in the
face of an almost unbroken line of authority have upheld this doctrine in connection
with certain types of crime. In State v. Bruder,6 for example, the defendant was
prosecuted under a Missouri statute that prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors to
minors. The court held that the act was prohibited absolutely and the fact the
defendant thought the purchaser was of age was no defense.
The difficulty that the problem presents is that of ascertaining which crimes
require a criminal intent and which do not. The intent has not been required 7 in
3. The Osaka Kaisha Line based its contention that such an intent was neces-
sary, on Taylor v. United States, 207 U. S. 120 (1907). The Supreme Court dis-
tinguished that case from the instant one in that the alien in the earlier case was a
sailor and not a passenger. In such a case an intent to leave the alien would be
necessary before the provision was violated, because the sailor is one of the agencies
which brought the ship in, and it is necessary that some of the crew of a vessel go
ashore to perform various duties.
4. 4 BL. COMM. *21; 1 Bisnop, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1930) § 287; The
Queen v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168 (1889); State v. Weisman, 225 S. W. 949 (Mo.
1920); People v. Parker, 38 N. Y. 85 (1868).
5. 97 Mass. 567 (1867).
6. 35 Mo. App. 475 (1889).
7. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses (1933) 33 CoL. L. R. 55.
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illegal sale of liquors,8 sales of impure foods and drugs,9 violations of anti-narcotic
acts,20 criminal nuisances,"1 and offenses against traffic regulations. 12 Many writers
and courts have classed these and other statutory crimes in which no intent is re-
quired as crimes that are nana prohibita as opposed to -nala in se."3  These terms
are fine sounding Latin phrases and look well in opinions, but when analyzed they
are broad and general and in effect mean nothing. Another concept that has been
used is that crimes which do not involve moral turpitude do not require a criminal
intent or mens rea.14 Again we have a classification that is of very little help. The
question is as to what is moral turpitude and, since conviction of any crime carries
a certain moral taint, what degree of moral turpitude is sufficient to require a criminal
intent. A third test has been formulated by Professor Sayre.' 5  He says that
criminal intent is not required in "public welfare offenses." The test that is used
is a balancing of the necessity for regulation and the benefit to the public against
the hardship on the individual. This seems to be the best and most useful test
available, when one considers that the real reason for any system of criminal law
is the regulation of society in order to afford the greatest protection to all. A
greater number of criminal statutes are today being interpreted as not requiring
criminal intent, because of the increasing complexity of civilization. The types of
crime that the doctrine has been applied to are all violations of the sort of regulation
that is necessary to a well ordered society. As an example, we have statutes which re-
quire automobiles to show certain lights at night. This is a regulation necessary to the
safety of other travelers and the drivers themselves, due to the heavy automobile
traffic on modem highways. If the prosecution were required to show that each
offender knew his lights were not working properly, convictions would be scarce,
and the law easily evaded. The courts have shown wisdom in adopting a statutory
interpretation that is progressive and necessary due to changing conditions.
In the noted case the Supreme Court felt that the great social importance of
preventing unauthorized aliens from landing in the United States justified the
extension of the doctrine to another type of crime. At first glance it might appear
that this case could be explained on negligence, in that such negligence supplied the
mens rea."' This, however, is not the basis of the decision, as the opinion clearly
8. Commonwealth v. Goodman, 97 Mass. 117 (1867); State v. Field, 119 S.
W. 499 (Mo. App. 1909).
9. State v. Huber, 4 Boyce 259, 88 Ad. 453 (1913); Commonwealth v. Far-
ren, 91 Mass. 489 (1864); St. Louis v. Ameln, 235 Mo. 669, 139 S. W. 429 (1911).
10. United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250 (1922).
11. State v. Wells,, 70 Mo. 635 (1879); People v. High Ground Dairy Co., 166
App. Div. 81, 151 N. Y. Supp. 710 (2d Dept. 1915).
12. Goodwin v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. 140, 138 S. IV. 399 (1911).
13. People v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 442, 123 N. E. 543 (1919); 1 WHARTON, CRIM-
INAL LAw (12th ed. 1932), § 399.
14. Howell v. Stewart, 54 Mo. 400 (1873).
15. Sayre, loc. cit supra note 7.
16. Tift v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S. E. 41 (1916); Peay v. Commonwealth,
181 Ky. 396, 205 S. IV. 404 (1918).
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indicates that the defendant had an absolute duty to prevent the alien from landing,
and his landing would result in a volation of the statute regardless of defendant's
fault
DONALD H. CHISHOLM
HOMICIDE-DEATH RESULTING FROM IMPROBABLE CAUSE.
State v. Frazier1
In committing an assault and battery on the deceased, the defendant struck
with his fist only one moderate blow, which ordinarily would not have been dangerous
to life. Unknown to the defendant, however, the deceased was afflicted with hemo-
philia, a condition of the blood such as prevents coagulation and thereby permits
bleeding to go unchecked. Because of this condition a hemorrhage from the slight
laceration in the deceased's mouth caused by the blow ensued which lasted ten
days, ending in death. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed a conviction of the
defendant of manslaughter.
The case presents an interesting problem in legal causation, particularly in so
far as causation is concerned with "foreseeability." If the injury had been caused
by a negligent rather than an intentional act, and the action had been one in
tort, then different causation formulae would probably produce opposite results. If
the "natural or direct" formula were applied, then the defendant would be liable,2 as
there was undoubtedly causation in fact and no problem of an intervening force
is involved. The same results may even be reached if liability were made to depend
upon whether the negligent act was a "substantial factor" in producing the death.3
If, on the other hand, it were made to depend upon foreseeability, as under the
"natural and probable" formula used in Missouri, 4 then it would seem that a directed
verdict for the defendant would be proper.5
1. 98 S. IV. (2d) 707 (Mo. 1936).
2. Mann Boudoir Car Co. v. Dupre, 54 Fed. 646 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893); Balti-
more City Passenger Ry. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74 (1883).
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)§§ 431, 461.
4. Diehl v. A. P. Green Fire Brick Co., 299 Mo. 641, 253 S. NV. 984 (1923);
American Brewing Co. v. Talbot, 141 Mo. 674, 42 S. W. 679 (1897); Saxton v. Mo.
Pac. Ry., 98 Mo. App. 494, 72 S. W. 717 (1903).
5. Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. NV. 157 (1909). The
principal case is to be distinguished on the ground that the consequences were less fore-
seeable, from cases in which death results from the negligence of a physician in treat-
ing the injury, such as Homey v. St. Louis & N. E. Ry., 165 Ill. App. 547 (1911);
or cases in which death results from bloodpoisoning, as in Armstrong v. Montgomery
St. Ry., 123 Ala. 233, 26 So. 349 (1898). See also cases collected in (1914) 48 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 93. The consequences in the principal case would also seem less
foreseeable than in cases where the injury merely aggravates a latent pre-existing
disease, such as Herndon v. City of Springfield, 137 Mo. App. 513, 119 S. W. 467
(1909); Hillard v. Chicago City Ry., 163 Ill. App. 282 (1911); or cases where the
injury merely hastens inevitable death from a disease, as in Herke v. St. Louis &
S. F. Ry., 141 Mo. App. 613, 125 S. NV. 822 (1910). See also cases collected in 48
L. R. A. (N. S.) 119 (1914).
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If the principal case, where the defendant's conduct was not merely negligent,
but was intended by him to cause bodily harm, had been in tort, then it would seem
clear that the defendant would be liable." When a defendant's conduct was intended
to cause bodily harm, he is liable for the actual consequences of his acts, and it
matters not that the result was unforseeable or highly extraordinary, or even that
there was an intervening force.7
The same result is reached in criminal cases. Here too the defendant is liable
for the actual consequences of his intentional act even though such consequences
were not intended and could not reasonably have been foreseen by him.8 If the
defendant intentionally causes an injury which produces a disease resulting in death,
the defendant is criminally liable for the death.9 Even if the disease, or a feeble
condition, existed at the time of the injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
accelerated or contributed to the death, although the injury alone would probably
not have been fatal and although the disease itself would eventually have been
fatal.10 Moreover, it is immaterial that the defendant did not know of the disease
or feeble condition," or could not reasonably have anticipated that death would
result from his act.1 2
It would seem, therefore, that the holding in the principal case is proper. While
this would not be true if the primary reason for punishing a defendant were because
of his having had an evil mind, yet if the real concern is with the fixing of respon-
sibility for an injury which has occurred to society, possible hardship and lack of
reasonable foreseeability should be disregarded. Many authorities, however, believe
that the object of punishment is to protect society. If the application of this theory
would not result in an acquittal of the defendant on the charge of homicide, it would
at least make the principal case a proper one for the use of the indeterminate
sentence and individualization of treatment, based on scientific knowledge, after
the conviction of the defendant.' 3
SEsco V. TIPTON
6. Watson v. Rinderknecht, 82 Minn. 235, 84 N. W. 798 (1901); Vosburg v.
Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N. W. 403 (1891).
7. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 279; Hickey v. Welch, 91 Mo. App. 4
(1901); Bouillon v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 148 Mo. App. 462, 129 S. W. 401 (1910).
8. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW (1934) §§ 23 to 27.
9. State v. Block, 87 Conn. 573, 89 AtI. 167 (1913); see also cases collected in
29 C. J. 1080, § 55.
10. People v. Lanagan, 81 Cal. 142, 22 Pac. 482 (1889); see also cases col-
lected in 29 C. J. 1082.
11. Cunningham v. People, 195 Ill. 550, 63 N. E. 517 (1902); 29 C. J. 1082.
12. Baker v. State, 30 Fla. 41, 11 So. 492 (1892); 29 C. J. 1082.
13. Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code (1928). 41 HARV. L. REv. 453.
It is often suggested that this treatment should be applied by a board composed
largely, at least, of scientists in different fields.
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INSURANCE-DEATH WHILE VIOLATING LAW.
Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Eaton'
Insured died from injuries received in an automobile accident when he drove his
car off the road and over an embankment. He had been driving at an excessive rate
of speed and there was some evidence that he had been drinking. The accident
insurance policy did not cover death or injuries sustained by the insured "while
intoxicated, or under the influence of an intoxicant, or while violating law." It
'was held that the intoxication of the insured at the time of the accident, or the
violation of the law at that time, need not contribute to, or cause the death or in-
juries, in order to exempt the insurance company from liability on the policy; there-
fore, if the insured was intoxicated, or under the influence of an intoxicant, or
speeding in violation of the law at the time when the injuries were received, the
company was not liable.
The holding that no causal connection is necessary between the injuries or
death of the insured and the insured's intoxication is in accord with the majority
view under the same type of intoxication clause found in the principal case." In a
Missouri case where an accident policy provided that if the injury was sustained
while the insured was under the influence of an intoxicant, his recovery should be
one-eighth of what it otherwise would be, it was held that the provision was to
apply without regard to whether or not the intoxication caused the injury. The
court said that the insurance company had, by its policy, refused to insure the
insured against accidental injury while he was intoxicated.3 However, a recent
Ohio case held that even under the "while intoxicated" clause there must be causative
connection; otherwise, there would be a legal fraud practiced on the insured, since
if the insured was in an intoxicated condition and was struck by lightning, the
insurance company would not be held liable under the policy.4 That case is contrary
to the majority view, and is the only case found by the writer to that effect.
As for the "violation of law" clause, this has generally appeared in the litigated
cases, in substantially this form: the insurance company shall not be liable if the
injury or death of the insured occurs in consequence of, or resulting from violation of
the law. This provision has been construed the same in both the accident and
the life insurance policies.' It is held that under such a provision there must be some
1. 84 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
2. Flannagan v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 22 F. (2d) 136 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1927); Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Greer, 43 F. (2d)
499 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); Murdie v. Maryland Casualty Co., 52 F. (2d) 888 (D. C.
Nev. (1931); Shader v. Ry. Passenger Assurance Co., 66 N. Y. 441 (1876); 1 C. J. 457.
3. Mossop v. Continental Casualty Co., 137 Mo. App. 399, 118 S. W. 680
(1909).
4. Washington Fidelity Natl Ins. Co. v. Herbert, 49 Ohio App. 151, 195 N. E.
492 (1934).
5. 6 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1928) 5201.
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1937], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss2/10
RECENT CASES
causative connection between the act which constitutes the violation of the law and
the death or injuries of the insured,6 and whether there is or not, is a question for
the jury.7 The provision of the policy in the principal case contains no words of
causation. Yet, even in such a policy the courts have held that, to exempt the in-
surance company, the injury must be caused by or result from the violation of the
law.8 Why courts reach different results under the "while intoxicated" clause from
those reached under the "while violating the law" clause is not clear. Perhaps it
is due to the indignation of the courts against a person driving a car while intoxi-
cated (some of the cases have been automobile cases). Perhaps it is due to the
feeling that, though intoxication may have really contributed to the accident, the
causal connection is not clear and the jury will find none if permitted to pass upon
the question.
The principal case is the only one found by the writer which holds contrary to
the majority view under the "violation of the law" clause-or rather, purports to
hold to the contrary, since the decision can be sustained on the "intoxication" clause.
6. Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Ingram, 362 Ind. 350, 198 N. E. 798 (1935);
Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers' Ass'n, 186 Iowa 454, 172 N. W. 454 (1919);
Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Hunt, 136 Miss. 156, 98 So. 62 (1923); Accident Ins.
Co. of North Am. v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 258, 16 S. W. 723 (1891); Guy v. Grand
Lodge, Colored Knights of Pythias of Texas, 46 S. W. (2d) 1057 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932). Note (1922) 17 A. L. R. 1005.
In Landry v. Independent Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 17 La. App. 10, 135 So. 110(1931), insured was employed to conduct poker games, in violation of law. He or-
dered a player who was marking the cards to leave the game, whereupon the player
shot him. His policy provided that he was not covered for death resulting from
violation of law. It was held that the direct and proximate cause of the killing
arose out of and resulted from violation of law.
The death or injury may be due proximately to the violation of the law. It is
not necessary that it be the direct result. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Seaver, 86 U. S. 531(1873); Bloom v. Franklin Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478 (1884).
7. Davilla v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 299 Pac. 831 (Cal. App. 1931); Rowe v.
United Commercial Travelers' Ass'n, 186 Iowa 454 (1919).
8. Davilla v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 299 Pac. 831 (Cal. App. 1931); Fisher v.
Midland Casualty Co., 189 Ill. App. 486 (1914); Matthes v. Imperial Accident
Ass'n, 110 Iowa 222, 81 N. W. 484 (1900); Washington Fidelity Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Herbert, 49 Ohio App. 151, 195 N. E. 492 (1934); Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Hargraves, 169 Tenn. 388, 88 S. W. (2d) 451 (1935).
In those policies which contain no provision exempting the insurer from liability
with regard to the insured's violating the law, the insurer is liable, notwithstanding
the fact that he may have been injured as the result of violation of the law, if it does
not appear that the policy was obtained in contemplation of such violation and the
danger consequent thereon. Zurich General Accident and Liability Ins. Co. v. Flick-
inger, 33 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Jordon v. Logia Suprema de la Alianza
Hispano-Americana, 23 Ariz. 584, 206 Pac. 162 (1922). Some violations of the law
have been held to exempt the insurance company on the ground of public policy.
Piotrowski v. Prudential Ins. Co., 141 Misc. 172, 252 N. Y. Supp. 313 (1931) (fel-
ony); Wells' Adm'r v. New Eng. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Boston, 191 Pa. 207, 43
Ati. 126 (1889) (abortion); see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Roma, 97 Colo. 493,
496, 50 P. (2d) 1142, 1143 (1935) (gangster killed by person unknown).
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What constitutes a "violation of law" under the policy? It must be a violation
of a state law; a violation of a city ordinance is not sufficient to avoid the policy.9
Massachusetts has held that the violation refers only to criminal and not civil law.'0
The Supreme Court of Indiana said: "A known violation of a positive law, whether
the law is a civil or criminal one, avoids the policy if the natural and reasonable
consequences of the violation are to increase the risk; a violation of law . . . does
not avoid the policy if the natural and reasonable consequence does not increase the
risk."" On the basis of the intention of the parties this would seem to be the better
view.
The court in the principal case cites Flannagan v. Provident Life and Accident
Ins. Co.,' 2 in which, under substantially the same policy provision, where the
insured was driving his car while in an intoxicated condition, in violation of a statute
which made driving a car while intoxicated a misdemeanor, and was injured when
the car ran off the road, it was held that the policy was avoided. The court said
that there need be no causative connection between the intoxicated condition and
the injury. It did not pass upon the question whether there had to be causative
connection between the violation of law and the injury, since it was not necessary
to do so.
How far is the court prepared to go? Under its reasoning it would seem that
if the insured was driving his car without a rear license tag, and he was injured in a
collision at an intersection, the insurance company would not be liable under the
terms of the policy. This interpretation, obviously, is not the intention of the
parties.
MILTON I. MOLDAFSKY
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY OF MASTER TO SERVANT'S WIFE INJURED BY THE
SERVANT IN SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT.
Rosenblum v. Rosenblum'
This was the action by the wife against her husband's employer for injuries sus-
tained in an automobile accident, as a consequence of the husband's negligence,
9. Washington Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Herbert, 490 Ohio App. 151, 195 N.
E. 492 (1934).
10. Cluff v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 13 Allen 308 (Mass. 1886).
11. Bloom v. Franklin Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478, 484 (1884); cf. Conner v. Union
Auto. Ins. Co., 122 Cal. App. 105, 9 P. (2d) 863 (1932).
12. 22 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927). The court also cites for a discussion
of the Flannagan case, Travelers Protective Ass'n of Am. v. Prinsen, 291 U. S. 576
(1934), where the assured had a certificate of membership in a fraternal benefit
association, providing benefits for accidental death. 'The certificate exempted the
association if death occurred "when" a member was "participating" in the trans-
portation of explosives. The assured was riding on a truck carrying dynamite caps
when it was struck by a train. The assured was blown to pieces. It was held that
to exempt the insurer, it was not necessary to find a causative connection between
the death and the forbidden act, since the effect of that act was to aggravate the
hazard in the very event that happened. Compare this Supreme Court case with
Bloom v. Franklin Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478 (1884).
1. 96 S. W. (2d) 1082 (Mo. App. 1936).
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while the wife was accompanying the latter on a business trip within the scope of
his employment. Held, that the action could be properly maintained by the wife
against the employer.2
On the familiar doctrine of respondeat superior the employer would have been
liable if the servant, the driver of the car, had been a stranger to the plaintiff. The
question, then, is whether the rule of liability is different where the servant is the
husband of the plaintiff. In Missouri, the law to the effect that an action of tort for
personal injury by the wife against her husband cannot be maintained has never been
changed.3 If then, under Missouri law, a husband is incapable of committing a per-
sonal tort against his wife, or the wife against the husband, and the doctrine of
respondeat superior may be said to impose liability upon the master only in those
cases in which the servant is liable to the third party, it would seem to follow that
no liability can attach to the master for injuries to the wife occasioned by the neg-
ligence of the servant-husband. Some courts, possibly approaching the problem by
an unexpressed literal translation of respondeat superior, hold that unless the servant
is liable there can be no liability on the part of the master.4
However, a contrary result has been reached in New York,5 a state in which
the common law doctrine forbidding personal tort actions by one spouse against the
other prevails, 6 in a case which held that the husband's employer is liable to the
wife for injuries occasioned by the husband's negligence, notwithstanding that the
wife could not have maintained an action therefor against her husband.
Additional support for the principal case is to be found in the comparatively
recent cases of Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corporation,7 and Poulin v.
Graham.8 The principal case is closely analogous to the case of Lusk v. Lusk,"
2. The identical principle was approved in the very recent case of Mullally v.
Langenberg Bros. Grain Co., 98 S. W. (2d) 645 (1936), by the Missouri Supreme
Court. The court recognized the right of a recovery, under similar facts to the
principle case, but held the defendant to have been acting outside the scope of his
authority at the time of the alleged injury.
3. Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S. W. 382 (1915); Butterfield v. But-
terfield, 195 Mo. App. 37, 187 S. W. 295 (19163; Ex Parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226
S. W. 936 (1920); Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S. W. (2d) 1084 (1933).
4. Maine v. James Maine and Sons, 198 Iowa, 1278, 201 N .W. 20 (1924).
The court apparently reasons that since the liability of the master logically is
grounded solely on the negligence of the servant, the master cannot be liable where
the servant is not negligent; and, by analogy, if there can be no recovery by the
plaintiff against the servant there can be no recovery against the master. Emerson
v. Western Seed and Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N. W. 297 (1927); Riser v.
Riser, 240 Mich. 402, 215 N. W. 290 (1927) "If the servant is not liable the master
is not liable." Hence the master is not liable for injuries sustained by the wife of
the servant.
5. Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42
(1928).
6. Perlman v. Brooklyn City R. R., 191 N. Y. Supp. 891 (1921).
7. 111 Conn. 377, 150 Atl. 107 (1930).
8. 102 Vt. 307, 147 At]. 698 (1929).
9. 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932).
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a West Virginia case, wherein the court allowed a recovery against an insurance
company by a minor plaintiff, injured by the negligence of his father, who was in-
sured with the defendant insurance company. A similar right of action was upheld
by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Dunlap v. Dunlap.'0
Possibly an understanding of the true basis of the so called doctrine of respond-
eat superior will more readily enable one to determine what result ought to be
reached in the instant case. If the basis of such a doctrine be the theory of identifi-
cation (the owner does what his employee does"), then we might well argue that
the master would not be liable under circumstances imposing no liability on the
servant. However, the better explanation of respondeat superior lies in the entrepre-
neur theory. According to this view, it is socially more expedient to distribute among
a large group of the community, through the medium of the employer, the losses
which experience has taught are inevitable in the carrying on of industry, than to
let the loss lie where it falls.12 The employee, the actual tort feasor, is typically
execution proof. The justification of this policy is reflected in workman's compensa-
tion laws, wherein the loss to wage earners resulting from the accidents of industry
is regarded as an expense of production which the employer should bear, just as he
bears the other expenses of production. Since the burden falls on all employers alike
he will be able normally to absorb and distribute the loss through the differential
between price and production cost.
The principal case breaks away from the strict, syllogistic logic of respondeat
superior, as does the modern trend of authority. There is little reason of policy that
denies a recovery against the master by an injured spouse simply because a marital
relation prohibits a recovery against the negligent party. Certainly it is doubtful
that marital peace would be endangered thereby; at all events it would be outweigh-
ed by contrary considerations. And as to the more technical aspects, weight is no
longer given to the outworn concept of the common law that husband and wife are
one. Nor is it a sufficient answer to urge that in view of the fact that the master may
recover over against the servant, a suit against the former would be in effect an in-
direct action by the wife against her husband-a thing which she is directly for-
bidden to do. To deny relief because of such an argument would be to impose a
present hardship upon the wife, with only the possibility of a future hardship upon
the husband; in most instances the servant-husband is execution proof. Perhaps the
only argument to the contrary, with reference to policy in this case, is that to per-
mit such an action by the wife against the employer opens the door to collusion and
fraud between husband and wife.
WILLIAM VAN MATRE
10. 84 N. H. 352, 150 AtI. 905 (1930).
11. Criticized in BArY, VIcARIOus LIAILITrY (1916) 147.
12. Smith, Frolic and Detour (1923) 23 CoL. L. REV. 444; Douglas, Vicarious
Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 YALE L. REv. 584.
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SALEs-WARRAN-TY-LIABILITY OF WHOLESALER OF FOOD TO CONSUMERS.
Degouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co.1
Plaintiff, injured by eating a can of salmon which contained a black fly, sued
the retail grocer, her immediate vendor, and the H. D. Lee Company, wholesaler,
joining them as defendants in the action for breach of implied warranty as to the
fitness for human consumption of the salmon. The salmon was purchased by the
Lee company from the Pacific American Fisheries, a Washington corporation, and
was packed for the wholesaler by an Alaskan plant of the corporation. The can was
sold under the Lee label, although it did state that the salmon was "packed for" the
Lee company. The question presented on appeal was whether or not there was
enough evidence to go to the jury concerning the liability of either of the defend-
ants. Held: The action will not lie against the Lee company because the parties are
not privies in contract. Suit remanded to proceed against the retail grocer.2
The case is of interest because it is seemingly one of first impression in the
United States, and the determination that a wholesaler of food is not liable to a
remote purchaser in implied warranty for lack of privity of contract, follows by a
few months a decision by the same court holding a manufacturer of beverage liable
to a remote purchaser on the warranty theory though privity of contract was lack-
ing.3 Obviously these two pronouncements provoke inquiry into the nature of a re-
covery for breach of implied warranty in food cases to facilitate, if possible, an un-
derstanding of how the privity requirement may be ignored in the one case and
embraced in the other.
Apparently one of the earliest bases in English law for recovery for injury suf-
fered by eating bad food, was an action on the case for deceit.4 At that time criminal
statutes made dealers in food and drink for immediate human consumption liable to
punishment for selling unwholesome merchandise. 5 The action in case for civil repara-
tion for the same dereliction was based on this penal liability and closely resembled an
action on a warranty because no scienter needed to be proved.' Later an action for
breach of warranty, express or implied, bottomed on the same penal liability as was
1. 100 S. IV. (2d) 336 (Mo. 1936).
2. The scope of this article is limited to a discussion of that portion of the
opinion which deals with the liability of the wholesaler, and is concerned with the
liability of such wholesaler for food sold in sealed containers.
3. Madouros v. K. C. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 90 S. IV. (2d) 445 (Mo. 1936).
4. 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (3rd ed. 1923) 386 and 448;
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 184. There was also a liability of innkeepers,
and others whose callings were of a quasi public character, for want of skill in the
exercise of their callings, enforced by an action in tort on the custom of the realm.
5. 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 241; MELICK, THE SALE OF FOOD AND
DRINK (1936) c. 1; Ames, History of Assumpsit (1888) 2 HtAv. L. REv. 1, 9.
6. Ames, History of Ass-umpsit (1888) 2 HAv. L. REv. 1, 8; MELIcK, THE
SALE OF FOOD AND DRINK (1936) 8; 1 CHITT , PLEADINGS (16th Am. ed. 1876) 154.
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the action on the case, was afforded an additional remedy in assumpsit.7 When or why
the general rule that privity of contract was necessary to sue on a warranty as to
chattels arose, is not known," but the concept attained a universal scope and was
applied to warranties of food as well as warranties of other chattels.0
Today an injured consumer of foods may seek remedy against his vendor or a
manufacturer by two methods other than warranty, namely an action for deceit, 10 or
an action for negligence." In the latter action the old requirement of privity of
contract 12 has been abrogated in food cases' 3 as in many others.' 4 Theoretically, at
least, the action for negligence differs from an action for breach of warranty because
in the latter there is an absolute liability for lack of the warranted qualities, and the
existence or absence of fault is immaterial.15
The Afadouros case,' 6 which dispensed with privity in suit by a remote purchaser
in implied warranty against the Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Company, by de-
claiming that if privity of contract was needed such "exists in the consciousness and
understanding of all right-thinking persons," is far from being an orphan in the di-
gests.'17 Other food cases have similarly rendered the privity requirement innocuous
by finding a third party beneficiary contract,' s or a warranty running with the
7. 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 195. The earliest reported decision
of an action on a warranty being brought in Assumpsit was in 1778 in the case of
Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18.
8. Among the suggested reasons for the growth of the privity requirement
have been the following: 1. privity actually existed in the early warranty cases; 2.
the use of assumpsit as a remedy may have led the courts to regard warranty as a
contractual obligation; 3. this was a manifestation of a policy to protect a manu-
facturer against liability to unknown persons. See comments (1932) 7 WASH. L.
REv. 351, 356; (1937) 21 MINN. L. REV. 315, 323.
9. For a statement as to the general privity rule in Missouri see Ranney v.
Meisenheimer, 61 Mo. App. 434 (1895); Crocker v. Barron, 234 S. W. 1032 (Mo.
App. 1921). Decisions applying the requirement to food cases are so numerous as
to make a complete listing impractical. For examples see Newhall v. Ward Baking
Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N. E. 625 (1922) (decision subsequent to adoption of Sales
Act); Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923) (decision sub-
sequent to the adoption of the Sales Act); and Thomason v. Ballard and Ballard,
208 N. C. 1, 179 S. E. 30 (1935) (Sales Act not adopted in this state).
10. Niles v. Danforth, 97 Vt. 88, 122 Ati. 498 (1923).
11. See comment (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 73.
12. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
13. Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64
(1921); Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N. J. L. 748, 70 At. 314 (1908).
14. (1937) 21 MINN. L. REv. 315, 318; (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 73, 74.
15. 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 237.
16. 90 S. W. (2d) 445 (Mo. App. 1936).
17. See for example Davis v. Van Camp Pkg. Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382
(1920); Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. (2d) 199 (1933); Nock v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Works of Pittsburgh, 102 Pa. Super. Ct. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931); Mazetti
v. Armour and Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
18. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928).
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goods.19 Obviously from the viewpoint that privity of contract is necessary in a
warranty action the Madouros case and the case under discussion cannot be recon-
ciled. Perhaps, however, this juggling of the minor premise may be justified on
grounds of policy.
It is evident from a reading of the Madouros case that the court, though grant-
ing relief on a petition declaring on a warranty basis, 20 denied the privity restriction
because it felt that a manufacturer should be held as an insurer of its food or drink.21
Manifestly a simple way of creating the status of insurer is to allow the suit in war-
ranty because neither fault nor a misrepresentation is necessary to be proved, but
only that the seller knew the purpose for which the goods were purchased and that
the purchaser relied on the seller to furnish merchandise fit for that purpose. The
policy motivating the court to impose absolute liability was probably the convic-
tion that the control of a manufacturer over his product subjected him to being held
to the rigid standard of public guardian, coupled with the notion that this liability
is one that can properly be borne as an incident of the business.
Recognizing this policy as the basis for ignoring the absence of privity in the
above case, the pith of the Degouveia decision stands in the declaration that "When
the salmon in question was purchased by the H. D. Lee Mercantile Company it was
sealed with no opportunity for that company to inspect it and discover whether it
contained the foreign matter found in its contents by the plaintiff. Consequently,
that company was in a different situation than the manufacturer, whose duty it was
to see that no harmful matter got into the food when it was being packed." Evidently
the court felt that a wholesaler should not be held to the absolute standard, and so
invoked the privity rule, because, as aforementioned, duty and fault are not com-
ponents of a recovery in warranty.22
A consideration of these two cases leads a reader to one of two alternatives.
From the standpoint of respecting the form of the present day action in implied
warranty, the privity requirement, historically unsound though it may be, should
be adhered to in all cases, and the practice of abrogating it through various fictions
in opinions based on concepts of duty and fault should be discontinued. From a
standpoint of using the action as a means of apportioning liability to the marketing
agency that is conceived of as being the proper one to be subjected to a rigid stan-
19. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927);
Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 141 So. 762 (1932); Ward v. More-
head City Sea Food Co., 171 N. C. 33, 87 S. E. 958 (1916).
20. See p. 448 of the opinion which says, "It will be observed, however, that
the petition herein does not declare on negligence, hence we need not spend time on
the case as if it were submitted on that theory. The petition sets out all the facts ....
In these, neither fraud nor deceit is pleaded . . .
21. Comment (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 73.
22. See MELICK, THE SALE OF FOOD AND DRINK (1936) c. 9 for a statement of
the cases applying the same principle as the Madouros case and an analysis of them
purporting to show that the overwhelming majority sound in tort though tried in
warranty.
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dard and is best able to redistribute losses,2  it is economically unsound to arbitrarily
classify manufacturers and wholesalers in different groups. The large wholesaler who
brands the products of various small manufacturers and sells them as his own, is in
a position to gain market control through the integration of manufacturing With
marketing.24 Such a wholesaler is very apt to control production and may even
maintain an inspector at the establishment of the manufacturer.2" In such case the
policy Which permits recovery by a remote vendee against a manufacturer of the
type in the Madouros case, should as well permit recovery against a branding job-
ber.26 Following this approach to the problem, even if it be conceded that the whole-
saler is not the proper party to be ultimately held liable, a denial to the consumer of
the right to sue the jobber, especially when it and the dealer are joined as defend-
ants,2r serves only to multiply the suits and costs necessary to the ultimate recov-
ery.
In fine, it is submitted that for clarity of opinion and certainty of precedent,
it is desirable for the courts to pursue one of the two choices. An intermediate
course is neither judicially consistent nor economically sound.
0. S. BREWER
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SCOPE OF OFFICER'S PRIVILEGE WITHOUT A VARRANT.
State v. Raines'
A laundry was robbed and several articles taken therefrom. Defendant was seen
near the laundry on the eve of the robbery, and several persons reported having
seen him with the stolen goods. An officer on this information secured a search
warrant and proceeded to the home of the defendant where he arrested him, searched
his room, and found there the stolen goods. The defendant objected to the intro-
duction of the stolen goods in evidence, saying that the warrant was void because
23. For comments dealing with the feasibility of requiring privity in suits
against a manufacturer, see (1933) 18 CORN. L. Q. 445; (1932) 7 WASH. L. REV.
351, 358; (1937) 21 MINN. L. REV. 315.
24. See CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF MARKETING (1926) 154; BECKMAN, WHOLESALE-
ING (1926) c. III and IV.
25. For a well documented note dealing with the economic approach to con-
sumer protection see (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 77.
26. That this idea has in part been recognized in the field of tort law is ex-
emplified by section 400 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, which provides that
one who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject
to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer. This rule, though, is lim-
ited to those cases where it appears from the labels that the brander is the sole
manufacturer and will not permit recovery where "packed for" etc. is included in the
label. Degouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 100 S. W. (2d) 336 (Mo. App. 1936).
27. The joinder here corresponded in fact to a situation where an impleader
is used to avoid circuity of action.
1. State v. Raines, 98 S. W. (2d) 580 (Mo. 1936).
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it did not sufficiently describe the premises to be searched. The court said, how-
ever, that since the officer had kept the warrant in his pocket all the time and had
not mentioned or disclosed it to the defendant, all evidence admissible if the warrant
had not been secured would be allowed. The court then admitted in evidence the
stolen goods. On appeal, the decision was affirmed, the appellate court saying that
"since the arrest was lawful, the search of defendant's room, in which the arrest
was made, the search being made after the arrest and incident thereto, was author-
ized; and that the articles seized, being things of evidentiary value tending to show
defendant's guilt of the offense for which he was arrested, were lawfully taken and
properly admitted in evidence at the trial."
The search and seizure clauses found in the Constitution of the United States
and in the constitutions of the various states present more practical difficulties than
problems of policy. The federal2 constitution in its fourth amendment declares that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
The original occasion for this constitutional provision will probably be found in the
abuse of executive authority and in the unwarrantable intrusion of executive agents
seeking to obtain in the houses and among the private papers of individuals evi-
dence of political offenses either committed or designed.3 This interference much
felt in England before the American Revolution was also suffered in the United
States at that time through writs of assistance given to revenue officers in the col-
onies to search suspected places for smuggled goods. 4 Undoubtedly it was with this
in view that the people inserted in the federal constitution the search and seizure
clause. The states followed suit and provided for the same or a similar clause in
their constitutions." It was felt that near in importance to the exemption from any
2. This clause of the federal constitution applies only as a protection against
federal officers and federal agents, and not as protection against state officers. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not change this. Johnson v. State, 152 Ga. 271, 109 S.
E. 662 (1921). The clause applies only to governmental action, and not to individual
action. Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
3. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. by Carrington, 1927) 612.
4. COOLEY, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 612.
5. Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 11, 19: "The privilege against self-
incrimination is frankly a barrier thrown up to protect the person against govern-
mental infringement on privacy, in order to preserve a healthy relationship between
the people and the government. The people in adopting the constitution, the courts
and the legislatures, have deemed it more important to protect certain relationships
than to discover the truth by the straining of these relationships." Is not this also
the purpose of the search and seizure clause? For a historical discussion of the
clause see, 2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1929) § 720.
6. Mo. CONST. art II, § 11.
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arbitrary control of the person was the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
7
Because of the broad language of the clause the concept of what is an unreason-
able search and seizure is and must be judicial. The courts have interpreted the
scope of what is reasonable in the light of common law traditions.8 And although
they have come to use certain words to define it, it is nevertheless incapable of exact
definition from an abstract point of view, since it must depend on the interpretation
of such phrases as "immediate presence," "immediate control," or "immediate sur-
roundings," of the person arrested.0 Each particular case must be determined on its
own facts and circumstances. There is no general rule.' 0 As a guiding principle, how-
ever, the clauses "should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy en-
croachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by im-
perceptible practice of courts, or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous,
executive officers."1 An occasional dictum may be found to the effect that no
search can ever be justified under the federal laws without a warrant,12 but these
dicta were not intended to be taken literally and are without support.13 The ac-
cepted rule is that an officer, as an incident of a lawful arrest and without a search
warrant, has the right to search the person and the immediate premises under the
control of the person arrested, and to seize articles found on him or on the premises,
such as weapons and evidence of the crime charged.
14
Though, as stated above, the courts agree upon the fundamental principles in-
volved, the cases often differ in the practical application of those principles. In a
West Virginia case' 5 the search was confined by the court to the very room in which
the defendant was arrested. A federal case' 8 allowed the search to be made of the
7. COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 610.
8. O'Connor v. U. S., 281 Fed. 396, 398 (D. C. N. J., 1922): "It is little more
than the affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the common law." The
immunity from searches and seizures is not from all searches and seizures, but from
searches and seizures unreasonable in the light of common law traditions. Gouled v.
U. S., 255 U. S. 298 (1920).
9. See the cases collected in (1931) 74 A. L. R. 1387; (1933) 82 A. L. R. 782.
(1933).
10. Dibello v. U. S., 19 F. (2d) 749, 750 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927): "Each par-
ticular case involving the question of an unreasonable search and seizure must be
determined by its own facts and circumstances."
11. Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298 (1920); Lefkowitz v. U. S., 285 U. S. 452
(1932).
12. U. S. v. Rembert, 284 Fed. 996, 1006 (S. D. Tex. 1922), where the court
said in summing up the case: "As to private residences, no search can ever be jus-
tified under the federal laws without a warrant."
13. See the cases collected in (1924) 32 A. L. R. 680; (1927) 51 A. L. R. 424;
(1931) 74 A. L. R. 1387; (1933) 82 A. L. R. 782.
14. Agnello v. U. S., 269 U. S. 20 (1925); State v. Turner, 302 Mo. 660, 259
S. NV. 427 (1924); The cases are collected in the annotations cited supra, note 13.
15. State v. Adams, 136 S. E. 703, 103 IV. Va. 77, 51 A. L. R. 407 (1927).
16. Sayers v. U. S., 2 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924).
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person arrested, of the hotel room in which he was arrested, and of those adjacent
hotel rooms under his control. In an Oregon case' 7 the search was deemed reasonable
where the defendant was arrested in his apartment and the officers searched his car
in the apartment garage, and there found the evidence used. So, also, it is generally
held not to be an unreasonable search where one is arrested for a traffic violation,
and the automobile is searched.' 8 A New York case"8 allowed officers to search an
article of clothing the defendant had temporarily set aside in the hallway, after the
defendant was arrested in his room. In another federal case20 when the defendant's
clothing was searched and a railroad trunk check was found in them, the court held
that the trunk might be obtained from the railroad checking office. The Missouri
Supreme Court points out that "a search is not unreasonable nor unlawful, so far
as the defendant is concerned, when made on the premises of other persons. ' '21 And
clearly the clause does not protect against searches made in open fields. 22 The arrest
may not, however, be made merely as an excuse for a general exploratory search.23
As asserted above, it is best that the constitutional provision be construed liber-
ally even in these days of highly organized crime. And although the courts should
not be averse to considering modem conditions in determining the "reasonableness"
of a particular type of search,2 4 they should still allow the full protection of the
guaranty contained in the amendment, for though it does sometimes shield the
guilty, its origin shows that its purpose is the giving of protection at just such a
sacrifice.25 Those states that follow the federal rule28 of exclusion of the evidence
when it is obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure do so to guarantee
further the protection intended by the amendment.27 While they feel that the pro-
bative value of the article taken is the same regardless of the reasonableness of the
17. State v. One Buick Automobile, 120 Ore. 640, 253 Pac. 366 (1927).
18. Haverstick v. State, 196 Ind. 145, 147 N. E. 625 (1925); Jameson v. State,
196 Ind. 483, 149 N. E. 51 (1925); State v. Williams, 14 S. W. (2d) 434 (Mo. 1929);
State v. Deitz, 136 Wash. 228, 239 Pac. 386 (1925).
19. People v. Manko, 189 N. Y. Supp. 357 (1921).
20. U. S. v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338 (S. D. N. Y. 1908).
21. State v. Pinto, 312 Mo. 99, 107, 279 S. W. 144 (1925).
22. Hester v. U. S., 265 U. S. 57 (1924).
23. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. U. S., 282 U. S. 344 (1931).
24. Carroll v. U. S., 267 U. S. 132 (1925) (fast moving automobiles).
25. U. S. v. Bookbinder, 278 Fed. 216 (E. D. Pa. 1922); U. S. v. 1013 Crates
of Empty Old Smuggler Whiskey Bottles, 52 F. (2d) 49, 51 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
26. Missouri follows the federal rule: State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S. W.
100 (1924). The court in that case said: "The federal rule is the result of years of
mature consideration, during which the question at issue was before the federal
courts under varying circumstances of fact, so that it has been tested and applied
to nearly all conceivable conditions. Sec. II, art. 2, of our constitution is almost iden-
tical in language and exactly identical in purport with Amendment No. 4 to the
federal Constitution."
27. ".... there is no adequate remedy available to the person injured whereby
he may obtain redress after the act. He would have an action for an unlawful tres-
pass or for assault at common law. The Constitution adds nothing to his rights in
29
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
2 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
search, yet they realize that as a practical matter unless such articles are excluded
as evidence, the abstract prohibition will not exert much actual force toward re-
straining over-zealous officials.28
In the instant case clearly there was a lawful arrest, and it is submitted that
even under a very strict interpretation of the scope of the protection guaranteed by
the search and seizure clause, the search was a reasonable one, properly incident to
the lawful arrest of the defendant.
ELMO HUNTER
TAXATION-TAx ON INcOmE DERIVED FROM LAND IN ANOTHER STATE.
New York ex rel Cohn v. Graves'
The New York income tax laws imposed a tax upon the entire net income of
all residents, 2 including rents derived from property located outside the state. 3 The
appellants income consisted in part of money received as rents from land located
outside the state, and interest on bonds secured by mortgages on real estate located
in another jurisdiction. It was contended the taxing of that part of her income
which was derived from property located in another state, and that part derived from
bonds secured by mortgages on real estate located in another jurisdiction was in
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because the tax
was: (1) retroactive in its application; (2) on bonds which had a business situs in
another jurisdiction; (3) on property located in another state.
The court refused to consider the objection to the retroactive operation of the
law because the point was not raised in the state court.
The contention that the bonds had acquired a business situs in New Jersey
was dismissed by the court on the grounds that the burden of proving that they had
that respect. The only remedy that can possibly benefit him is a preventive one."
State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 375, 259 S. W. 100, 108 (1924). Accord: Weeks v.
U. S., 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Taylor v. State,
129 Miss. 815, 93 So. 355 (1922); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N .W. 89 (1923);
Wiggin v. State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 Pac. 373 (1922). See the cases on admissibility
of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure collected in (1923) 24 A. L. R.
1408; (1924) 32 A. L. R. 408. See Atkinson, supra, note 5.
28. Prosecutors are naturally loath to proceed against the officers who have
furnished them the convicting evidence. "What prosecutor will go out of his way
to find grounds for criminal charge against the officers, whose delictual diligence has
raised the prosecutor's batting average? And, as has been humorously remarked, what
U. S. marshall is going to be confined on prison fare?" Atkinson, supra note 5, at 23.
"There is in fact no remedy, no method, by which the citizen can receive the pro-
tection of the Constitution except the method here contended for ... " (suppression
of the unlawfully obtained evidence). State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 375, 259 S. W.
100 (1924).
1. 57 Sup. Ct 466 (1937).
2. New York... N. Y. Tax Laws, Consol. Laws, § 351 of Article 16, c. 60 (as
added by N. Y. Laws 1919 c. 627).
3. New York ... N. Y. Laws c. 933 §359 (1935).
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acquired such a situs rested upon the appellant and the record did not show that she
had sustained this burden. Further, even though the bonds had acquired a business
situs in another state that fact would only place them in the same position as the
real estate involved in the case.
The important question decided by the court was whether a state may tax
one of its citizens upon income derived from property located in another state.
The power of the state to tax its citizens is based upon the assumption that the
state will render an equivalent to the taxpayer in protection.4 If the state is not
in a position to render the protection it has no power to tax. One state may not tax
property of its citizens located in another state because it is not in a position to give
the benefits of government to that property.5 From this fact does it follow that a
state should be prohibited from taxing the income of its citizens derived from prop-
erty located in another state?
The Supreme Court of the United States has said, "The tax, which is appor-
tioned to the ability of the taxpayer to bear it, is founded upon the protection af-
forded to the recipient of the income by the state, in his person, in his right to re-
ceive the income, and his enjoyment of it when received."0' The citizen of a state re-
ceives these benefits of government by virtue of his residence within a state
irrespective of whether he owns any income yielding property within or without
the state. To hold a tax on income derived from real estate located in another
jurisdiction in violation of the due process clause because a tax on the property
itself would be a taking of property without due process of law would be unrea-
sonable. The basis for declaring the tax on the property unconstitutional is that
the state offers no protection to the property. The state does protect the receipt
and enjoyment of the income, the taxpayer receives an equivalent in protection from
the state; therefore, the state is not taking property without due process of law.
An income is not necessarily immune from taxation whenever the source from
which that income is derived is not taxable. In Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Vir-
ginia7 the court held that a property tax on intangible property with a definite tax-
4. "The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every civilized
government, is exercised upon the assumption of an equivalent rendered to the tax-
payer in the protection of his person and property, in adding to the value of such
property, or in the creation and maintenance of public conveniences in which he
shares .... ." Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 202 (1905); Accord:
Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879); Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v.
City of Louisville, 245 U. S. 54 (1917); Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. i2 (1919);
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1931).
5. "If the taxing power be in no position to render these services ... the tax-
ation of such property within the domicil of the owner partakes rather of the nature
of an extortion than a tax, and has been repeatedly held by this court to be beyond
the power of the legislature and a taking of property without due process of law."
Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 202 (1905); Safe Deposit and
Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929).
6. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1931).
7. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929).
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able situs at the residence of the legal title holder could not be taxed at the residence
of the equitable owner if he lived in another state, because the other state was not
in a position to offer the advantages to this property which justify the exercise of
the taxing power. In Maguire v. Trefry,8 a Massachusetts income tax was held valid
as applied to income derived from the equitable interest in intangible property
which was located in another state, for the income was enjoyed, received and pro-
tected in Massachusetts and should bear its share of the costs of government.
State governments do not have the power to tax interstate commerce. Such
a power would interfere with Congressional power to regulate commerce between
the states.9 A tax on the gross receipts derived from interstate commerce would be
open to the same objection because it would be in the power of the state to make
such business profitable or unprofitable. However, a tax on the net income derived
from interstate commerce is valid because it is not levied unless profits are shown,
making it impossible for the state by the exercise of this power to interfere with the
regulation of commerce between the states.10 Following the above reasoning a tax
on the gross income from foreign commerce is invalid because it would interfere
with the right of Congress to regulate foreign commerce," and a tax on the net
income is valid because it would not interfere with the Congressional power.12
If the nature of property taxes and income taxes was the same there would be
some justification for limiting the power of the state to exercise the one in the same
way it is limited in exercising the other. However, "Neither tax is dependent upon
the possession of the taxpayer of the subject of the other.""3 Income may be taxed
though the taxpayer owns no property, property may be taxed though it produces
no income. The amount of the one tax is ascertained by determining the income re-
8. "The beneficiary is domiciled in Massachusetts, has the protection of her
laws, and there receives and holds the income from the trust property. We find
nothing in the fourteenth amendment which prevents the taxation in Massachusetts
of an interest of this character, thus owned and enjoyed by a resident of the state."
Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12, 17 (1919).
9. Philadelphia and S. Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (18S6);
Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (1888); Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161
(1889); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47 (1891); Pacific Exp. Co. v. Seibert, 142
U. S. 339 (1891); Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436 (1893).
10. "The difference in effect between a tax measured by gross receipts and one
measured by net income, recognized by our decisions, is manifest and substantial,
and it affords a convenient and workable basis of distinction between a direct and
immediate burden upon the business affected and a charge that is only indirect and
incidental. A tax upon gross receipts affects each transaction in proportion to its
magnitude and irrespective of whether it is profitable or otherwise. Conceivably it
may be sufficient to make the difference between profit and loss, or to so diminish the
profit as to impede or discourage the conduct of the commerce. A tax upon the net
profits has not the same deterrent effect, since it does not arise at all unless a gain
is shown over and above expenses and losses, and the tax can not be heavy unless
the profits are large." U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 328 (1917).
11. Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292 (1917).
12. Peck and Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165 (1917).
13. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1894).
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ceived, the other by determining the value of the property. Income may be taxed
but once; property may be taxed many times. The power of the state to levy an
income tax is based upon the protection rendered to the citizen in his person, the
power to levy a property tax is based upon the protection rendered to the property.
The nature of the two taxes being different it is not possible to say that an income
tax is a property tax, and since a tax on the property would be invalid the tax on
the income is likewise invalid.
Mr. Justice Stone in writing the majority opinion considered why a state has
the power to levy a tax on incomes. He found the reason for granting this power
present under these circumstances. From decisions in previous cases he found an
income is not always entitled to the same immunity from taxation as its source.
Finally he found the characteristics of these two taxes are not the same. From
these findings, he concluded that to impose the same restriction upon the state's
power to levy an income as that imposed upon its power to levy a property tax
would be an unreasonable interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
Mr. Justice Butler in his minority opinion placed a tax on income derived
from property in the same category as a tax on the property itself, citing as au-
thority for this proposition Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. and subsequent
cases interpreting that opinion. Declaring that the appellants right to own the land
and to collect the rents was not protected by New York law, he concluded that the
tax was in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
It is submitted that it is very fortunate that the majority of the court followed
Mr. Justice Stone rather than Mr. Justice Butler. Since it is desirable to think of the
law as based upon sound reasoning, whenever a court decides a new question of
law it is desirable to place the decision upon a reasonable basis. Justice Stone in his
commendable opinion determined the reason for allowing a state to tax incomes and
placed his answer to the problem on this basis. Justice Butler attempted to auto-
matically decide the question from previous decisions. Not only is the approach used
by Justice Butler an inferior one, but the premises upon which he based his con-
clusions are erroneous. The cases which he cited for the proposition that an income
tax is in "legal effect" a tax on the property itself do not so hold., 4 The Pollock
case holds, "that taxes on real estate being indisputably direct taxes, taxes on the
rent or income of real estate are equally direct taxes."' 5 The subsequent cases hold
that an income tax is a direct tax on the property for the purpose of determining
whether it should be apportioned according to population. But in no place is it said
that an income tax is for all purposes in legal effect or otherwise a direct tax on the
property itself.16 It is true that the New York laws do not protect the appellant's
14. The cases are collected in Justice Butler's dissenting opinion.
15. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1894).
16. " . .. it is admitted that a tax on real estate is a direct tax. Unless, there-
fore, a tax upon rents or income issuing out of lands is intrinsically so different from
a tax on the land itself that it belongs to a wholly different class of taxes, such
taxes must be regarded as falling within the same category as a tax on real estate
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right to own the land or to collect the rents. The state in which the land is located
protects the incidents of ownership of the property; for this reason this state alone
can assess a tax on the property.' 7 However, Mr. Justice Butler failed to consider
that the rents were brought into New York and were there protected by the laws
of the state. It is upon this protection of receipt and enjoyment of the income which
New York claimed the power to tax, and the Supreme Court upheld its power to
tax.' 8
C. D. TODD, JR.
es 'nomine." Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 580 (1894).
On rehearing the Court adhered to the opinion already announced that, taxes on
real estate being indisputable direct taxes, taxes on the rents or income of real estate
are equally direct taxes. 158 U. S. 601, 627-628. "The suggestion that such a tax
on the cattle constitutes a tax on the lands within the reasoning in the case of Pol-
lock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., is purely fanciful. The holding there was a tax
on rents derived from lands was substantially a tax on the lands." Thomas v. Gay,
169 U. S. 264, 274 (1897). "The constitutional meaning of the word direct was the
matter decided. Considering that the constitutional rule of apportionment had its
origin in the purpose to prevent taxes on persons solely because of their general
ownership of property from being levied by any other rule than that of apportion-
ment, two things were decided by the court: First, that no sound distinction existed
between a tax levied on a person solely because of his ownership of real property,
and the same tax imposed solely because of his general ownership of personal prop-
erty. Secondly, that the tax on the income derived from such property, real or per-
sonal, was the legal equivalent of a direct tax on the property from which said in-
come was derived, and hence must be apportioned." Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41,
82 (1899). "The ground of the decision in the Pollock Case was that a tax upon
income received from real estate and invested in personal property (as distinguished
from income received from the transaction of business) was in effect a direct tax
upon the property itself, and therefore invalid unless apportioned according to popu-
lation." McCoach v. Minehill R. R., 228 U. S. 295, 306 (1912). "This court has
decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax law of 1894 amounted in effect to
a direct tax upon property, and was invalid because not apportioned according to
population as prescribed by the constitution." Stratton's Independence v. Howbert,
231 U. S. 399, 414 (1913). ".... the conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did not
in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically and necessarily came
within the class of direct taxes on property, but on the contrary recognized the fact
that taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such
unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it would amount to accomplishing
the result which the requirement as to apportionment of direct taxation was adopted
to prevent, . . ." Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R., 240 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1915). "In
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., it was held that taxes upon rents and
profits of real estate and upon returns from investments of personal property were
in effect direct taxes upon the property from which such income arose, imposed by
reason of ownership; and that Congress could not impose such taxes without appor-
tioning them among the States according to population, as required by Art. 1, 2, cl. 3,
and 9, cl. 4 of th eoriginal Constitution." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 .S. 189,205(1919). "The matter then came before this court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co.; and the decision when announced disclosed that the same differences in
opinion existing elsewhere were shared by the members of the court,-five, the con-
trolling number, regarding a tax on such income as in effect a direct tax on the
property from which it arose and therefore as requiring apportionment, and four
regarding it as indirect and not to be apportioned." Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 260
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TORTS-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ARTICLES NEGLIGENTLY
MADE.
Jacobs v. Frank Adams Electric Co.'
Plaintiff sued for damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negli-
gence of the defendant in manufacturing an electric panel board. While engaged in
installing the board upon the premises of a purchaser who had bought it from a
jobber, the plaintiff sought to test the board in the usual manner by turning on the
current and observing if the results were satisfactory. Due to defective insulation,
the turning on of the current caused a loud explosion, and a flash from the board
temporarily blinded the plaintiff, causing the injuries to his eyes for which he brought
this action. Plaintiff, not having any contractual relations with defendant, sued on
the theory that defendant was negligent in delivering the board improperly insulated
in that such defect rendered the article dangerous and conducive to injury to any
person using it for the purposes for which it was intended. Defendant contended
that, not having any contractual relations with plaintiff, it was liable only if it knew
of the defect and that there was no evidence tending to show actual knowledge (no
such evidence was produced). Defendant appealed from an adverse verdict but the
judgment was affirmed in the St. Louis Court of Appeals. The court based its de-
cision upon the contention that Missouri has aligned itself with that group of au-
thorities which holds the manufacturer liable for injuries due to the negligent con-
struction of the product while such product is being used for the purpose for which
it was intended.2
An examination of the Missouri decisions in which the liability of a manufac-
turer to a consumer has been in issue shows that our courts have followed the tra-
ditional doctrines and have held the manufacturer liable in negligence only in those
instances where there was privity of contract or where the exceptions to that rule
1. 97 S. W. (2d) 849 (Mo. App. 1936).
2. As to the liability of a manufacturer to a consumer for personal injuries
received from unwholesome food and beverages as extended in Missouri, see Com-
ment (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 73.
(1919). In Lake Superior Mines v. Lord, a tax was levied upon royalties received
from mineral lands. The court held, that the "enactment may be reasonably inter-
preted as laying a tax upon interests in mineral lands." This tax, however, was
levied on the gross income from the land not the net income. 271 U. S. 577, 581
(1925). In Senior v. Braden, the state of Ohio levied a tax upon the equitable in-
terest in land held by one of its citizens. The value of the interest was measured
by the income received. The court held the tax to be invalid because it was a tax
on property located outside the state. This was not an income tax. 295 U. S. 422(1935).
17. Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
18. Problem of double taxation was not considered by the court because the
appellant did not allege that New Jersey had levied or threatened to levy a tax on
the income.
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were applicable. However the court in the principal case, by its interpretation of
the prior Missouri cases, has discarded the outworn doctrine that a manufacturer
is only liable to those with whom he is in privity of contract.3 It remains to be seen
whether the Missouri Supreme Court will approve of this interpretation. One of
the leading cases in Missouri upon the subject is that of Heizer v. Kingsland U, Doug-
lass Mfg. Co.4 In that case, the plaintiff's husband was killed by a defective thresher
made and sold by defendant to another. In rendering a judgment for defendant the
court adhered to the old privity of contract doctrine, as set out in the famous case
of Winterbottom v. TVright,5 with the words, "The plaintiff's case tends to show no
more than negligence, and an action based on that ground must be confined to the
immediate parties to the contract by which the machine was sold."' However, the
court did take cognizance of the exceptions which were developing, eventually to
destroy the privity of contract rule, but it further held that the fact situation in
issue did not come within any of the exceptions. 7 Seemingly by this decision Missouri
3. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916);
Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); W. T. Pate
Auto Co. v. Westbrook Elevator Co., 142 Miss. 419, 107 So. 552 (1926); Heckel v.
Ford Motor Co., 101 N. J. L. 385, 128 Atl. 242 (1925); White Sewing Machine Co.
v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N. E. 633 (1927); Collette v. Page, 44 R. I. 26, 114
Atl. 136 (1921); Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N. W. 855 (1928).
4. 110 Mo. 605, 19 S. W. 630 (1892).
5. 10 M. & W. 109 (1842). This case enunciated a doctrine which became
widely accepted and was followed for many years by courts unwilling to see the
duty of manufacturers extended to the general public with regard to negligently
made articles (or, at least, to as much of the public as might reasonably be expected
to come in contact with the article). In this case, defendant contracted to supply
mail coaches to the government. Plaintiff was hired to drive the coach and was lamed
for life when the coach broke down due to its negligent construction. The court laid
down the general rule that a manufacturer is not liable for negligence to third parties
who have no contractual relations with him. The main reason advanced by the court
was that they did not wish to see a flood of litigation in a new field arise. The
doctrine of this case was adopted by older American decisions when the question
was first presented. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 (1879); Goodlander Mill
Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 63 Fed. 400 (C. C. A. 7th, 1894); Bragdon v. Perkins-
Campbell Co., 87 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1898); Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255,
44 N. E. 457 (1896); Necker v. Harvey, 49 Mich. 517 (1883); Marvin Safe Co. v.
Ward, 46 N. J. L. 19 (1884); Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N. Y. 351 (1870); Losee v. Clute,
51 N. Y. 494 (1873); Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244 (1891); Barnes v.
Deliglise, 78 Wis. 628, 47 N. W. 1129 (1891).
6. 110 Mo. 605, 617, 19 S. W. 630, 634 (1892).
7. With the increasing complications and widespread industrialization of our
modern economic system it was inevitable that such a strict rule as the privity of
contract rule would undergo some change. The law is peculiar in that, when it has
a rule or doctrine which has become outmoded, it doesn't take direct action to re-
place such a rule by a more modern one. Instead the courts gradually, sometimes
very indirectly and almost imperceptibly, destroy the effectiveness of the outmoded
rule by affixing exceptions to it. This process was followed with regard to the tort
liability of manufacturers. The various exceptions which grew up around the privity
of contract rule were summarized by Judge Sanborn in Huset v. Case Threshing Ma-
chine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903). The three exceptions as laid down by
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became aligned with those courts which adhered to the doctrines of Winterbottom v.
Wright but which recognized the various exceptions which grew up around the privity
of contract rule.8
In 1924 the Supreme Court of Missouri seemingly disregarded the numerous
decisions adhering to the privity of contract rule and held defendant liable for
negligence when one of its beer bottles exploded and injured plaintiff.0 The court
said that defendant's liability was based on tort and not on contract and that
lack of contractual relations was, therefore, irrelevant. The court completely dis-
regarded the Heizer case, even though it was cited to them by defendant's counsel.
Had this decision been followed, we might well say that Missouri was one of the
states which has completely discarded the privity of contract rule with regard to
Judge Sanborn (note that the Heizer case preceded the Huset case and recognized
every exception laid down by Judge Sanborn) are as follows: (1) Every one is bound
to avoid acts or omissions imminently dangerous to the lives of others, said acts being
committed in the preparation or sale of an article intended to preserve, affect, or
destroy human life; (2) An owner's act of negligence which causes injury to one who
is invited by him to use his defective appliance upon the owner's premises may form
the basis of an action against the owner; (3) One who sells or delivers an article,
which he knows to be imminently dangerous to life or limb to another without notice
of its qualities, is liable to any person who suffers an injury therefrom which might
have been reasonably anticipated, whether there were any contractual relations be-
tween the parties or not. As stated and if strictly applied, these exceptions would
have been quite arbitrary. However, by one device or another, these exceptions have
been extended. The arbitrary categories of "articles intended to preserve, destroy or
affect human life" have been extended by merely superficial analogies to include
articles which have clearly no pre-eminent tendency to do so. Thus an air gun,
made as a toy for children has, apparently by an analogy to fire arms, been brought
within the exception. Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475 (E. D. Mich.
1918). The bottles in which effervescent drinks are put up are regarded as in the
same class as the drink which they contain. Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola Bottling
Co., 176 N. C. 256, 97 S. E. 27 (1918). Even soap and a coffee urn have been brought
within this exception. Another method has been adopted to extend the liability of
manufacturers. Cases have been brought within the exception which allows recovery
where the manufacturer knows that the article which he has made and is selling is
latently defective, by holding that he is to be regarded as knowing of any defect
which could have been discovered by care taken in its manufacture. Berg v. Otis
Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832 (1924). Clearly the privity of contract rule
has been whittled away by these exceptions until little, if any, of its original form re-
mains. For a discussion of these exceptions see Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to
Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees (1929) 45 L. Q. REV. 343; The
Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts (1903) 53 Am. L. REv. 337;
Studies in the Law of Torts (1926) 33, at 109.
8 Although the far-reaching decision of Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v.
Buick, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916), had been issued seven years before,
the Missouri court in 1923 still remained loyal to the narrow rule under discussion.
In Tipton v. Barnard & Leas Mfg. Co., 302 Mo. 162, 257 S. W. 791 (1923), plaintiff
was injured while installing a moving belt in the Excello Feed Milling Co., sold the
latter by defendant. The belt was defective and caused plaintiff to be injured. But
the evidence failed to show that defendant knew of the defect, and in the absence
of such a showing, the court held defendant not liable, thus following the Heizer case.
9. Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo. 520, 271 S. W. 497 (1924).
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liability of manufacturers to third parties. However in 1927 there arose the case of
McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co.,10 upon which the court in the present case bases
its decision. In the McLeod case, plaintiff sued and recovered for defendant's neg-
ligence in delivering a tank of oxygen to the welding shop of the plaintiff's father,
this negligence resulting in the explosion of the tank and subsequent injuries to
plaintiff. The court followed the privity of contract rule with the three exceptions
hereinbefore mentioned. There was no showing that defendant knew of the defect in
the tank. However, the court extended the exceptions to include things which,
though not inherently dangerous, become imminently dangerous, if defectively made,
when put to their intended use. Upon the basis of this extension of the exception
the court held defendant liable.1
As expressed before, the court in the principal case stated that the McLeod case
had aligned Missouri with that group of authorities which holds the manufacturer
liable for injuries due to the negligent construction of the product while such product
is being used for the purpose for which it was intended. The principal case is de-
cided on the understanding that Missouri has abolished the privity of contract rule
with regard to manufacturers' liability to third parties. On the contrary, the McLeod
case specifically set out the privity of contract rule as being the general rule and
referred to its ruling as an extension of one of the exceptions to the general rule.
In view of the specific declarations of the McLeod case the interpretation placed upon
that decision by the principal case seems a bit strained. However, the court reached
a desirable result. The extension of the exceptions to the general rule as announced
in the McLeod case is of such a far-reaching nature that it is hard to visualize a situa-
tion which the test laid down would not cover, thus reaching a result virtually iden-
tical with that which would be reached by courts applying straight negligence prin-
ciples. What, then, is left of the privity of contract rule which the court in the
McLeod case asserted to be the general rule? It is submitted that the rule laid
down in the McLeod case, purporting to be an exception to the general rule, is, in
reality, so comprehensive that it practically destroys the rule. The court in the
principal case (although not ostensibly) recognizes this situation and is, therefore,
justified in classifying Missouri with the modern trend of decisions which now realize
that a manufacturer's liability to third parties need not arise solely out of contract
but may arise out of violation of a duty which the manufacturer owes to every mem-
ber of the public whom he can reasonably foresee as coming in contact with the
article and whom he should reasonably know may be injured if the article is de-
fectively made. This is the position taken by the Restatement of the Law of Torts.!'
MORTON M. LEIBOWTZ
10. McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S .W. (2d) 122 (1927).
11. It is to be noted that the court makes mention of the case of Stolle v.
Anheuser-Busch, but doesn't regard it as controlling, seemingly not regarding it as
directly in point. To the writer there appears no valid distinction between the
cases. The court might well have held that the Stolle case put Missouri squarely in
line with judge Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick.
12. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 395.
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TORTS-LIABILITY FOR THE CONSEgUENCES OF FRIGHT RESULTING IN PHYSICAL IN-
JURY.
Mitnick v. Whalen Bros., Inc.1
Two automobiles driven by the defendants collided by reason of the negligence
of both drivers while the plaintiff was on the sidewalk close to them. As a result,
she was badly frightened and immediately fainted. She later had a miscarriage and
suffered pain and nervous shock. The court held that the jury might have found
that the plaintiff had just reached the intersection where the collision occurred, and,
having heard the crash, she looked and saw a car turned toward her, whereupon she
screamed, fainted, and fell; and that on the finding of these facts, the jury might
reasonably have found that the drivers' negligence was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury, and might have allowed recovery by her. The court evaded the
problem of whether physical injury is required by finding it was present in the
bruises the plaintiff suffered when she fainted. From the text of the opinion, how-
ever, it appears that Connecticut would not require physical impact, if the question
should arise in the jurisdiction.
The authorities are quite divided on the question of whether a plaintiff can re-
cover for physical injuries caused by fright and nervous shock, such fright and shock
being the result of the defendant's negligence. The more modern view allows re-
covery if the plaintiff shows the defendant was negligent, and that his negligence
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's fright. Such fright must be shown to have
caused the physical injury. In the jurisdictions that take this view the courts attack
the problem by finding whether the defendant owed a duty to refrain from such con-
duct, that is whether he could, as a reasonable man, foresee harm to the plaintiff.
These courts do not consider the damages too remote because fright is an element,
and they have expressed their theory to be that fright was but a link in the chain
of causation leading to the physical injury.2 The Restatement favors this view and
states the preferable rule of law to be as follows: "If the actor's conduct is negligent
as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than
by subjecting him to fright, shock or other similar and immediate emotional dis-
turbances, the fact that such harm results solely from the internal operation of
fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability."3
1. 115 Conn. 650, 163 At. 414 (1932).
2. For other courts that follow this view see: Central of Georgia Ry. v.
Kimber, 212 Ala. 102, 101 So. 827 (1924); Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Harris, 121 Md.
254, 88 Atl. 282 (1913); Lesch v. Great Northern Ry., 97 Minn. 503, 106 N. W. 955
(1906); Arthur v. Henry, 157 N. C. 438, 73 S. E. 211 (1911); Simone v. Rhode
Island Co., 28 R. I. 186, 66 Ad. 202 (1907); Mack v. South Bound R. R., 52 S. C.
323, 29 S. E. 905 (1898); Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S. D. 396, 167 N. W. 398 (1918);
Memphis Street Ry. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn 637, 194 S. W. 902 (1917); Price v.
Yellow Pine Paper Mill Co., 240 S. W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Pankopf v. Hink-
ley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N. W. 625 (1909).
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 436 (2).
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The other view allows recovery for the physical injuries resulting from fright
caused by defendant's negligence only when there has been some physical impact or
immediate physical injury. Here the courts attack the problem as one of causation,
holding that the damages, where there is no physical impact, are too remote and
speculative, and that the physical consequences of the fright are not the proximate
results of the defendant's negligence. Spade v. Lynn & B. R. R., 4 is the leading case
on this subject. It admits that a physical injury may be directly traceable to fright,
and so may be caused by it. It vindicates the rule that physical injury is necessary,
in that it is unreasonable to hold that persons who are merely negligent should an-
ticipate and guard against fright and its consequences; and also in that a wide door
for unjust claims would be opened if the rule were not applied.5
In Missouri this view has been followed.6 From the Missouri decisions the set-
tled law seems to be that the plaintiff cannot recover for fright or distress or the
physical results therefrom, unless there is external physical injury. In other juris-
dictions where the rule is applied, the impact may be very slight. In Missouri, how-
ever, the language of the court seems to imply that a more serious physical injury
is required. The jolting of the plaintiff while riding as a passenger in an elevator
which fell, has been held insufficient7 In another case, the plaintiff's husband
was shot and caused to fall against her. The court denied recovery on the ground
that there was no physical wound.8 In a New Jersey case the plaintiff testified that
something struck the back of her neck and dust got in her eyes. The court held that
either of these was sufficient physical injury.9 There are many cases in which a re-
covery was allowed when the injury was very slight, and, in relation to the damages
suffered, trivial.1o
4. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897).
5. For other states that refuse recovery on these grounds see: Haile v. Texas
& P. R. R., 60 Fed 557 (C. C. A. 5th, 1894); St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Bragg, 69
Ark. 402, 64 S. W. 226 (1901); Southern Ry. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S. E. 28
(1916); West Chicago St. Ry. v. Liebig, 79 Ill. App. 567 (1899); McGee v. Vanover,
148 Ky. 737, 147 S. W. 742 (1912); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N. W.
335 (1889); Crutcher v. C. C. C. & St. L. R. R., 132 Mo. App. 311, 111 S. IV. 891
(1908); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 73 N. J. L. 405, 63 Ad. 860 (1906);
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896); Miller v. Baltimore &
0. S. W. R. R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N. E. 499 (1908); Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 At. 4 (1909).
6. Porter v. St. Joseph R. L. H. & P. Co., 311 Mo. 66, 277 S. W. 913 (1925);
McCardle v. Peck Dry Goods Co., 271 Mo. 111, 195 S. V. 1034 (1917). See more
exhaustive treatment of liability in Missouri for the physical consequences resulting
from emotional disturbance. Comment (1937) 2 Mo. L. REX. 67.
7. McCardle v. Peck Dry Goods Co., 271 Mo. 111, 195 S. W. 1034 (1917).
8. State ex rel. Renz v. Dickens, 95 S. W. (2d) 847 (Mo. 1936).
9. Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 73 N. J. L. 405, 63 At. 860 (1906).
10. For an extensive examination and criticism of this view, see Bohlen, Right
to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact (1902). 41 Amxi.
L. REG. (N. S.) 141.
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In comparing these two rules, the one which does not require physical impact
seems to be the more desirable. The second view denying recovery fails to observe the
fact that medical science can ascertain if the physical injuries suffered are a result of
the fright, and if such fright was genuine. The law, as has often been said, is a pro-
gressive science, and it should develop and change with changing conditions and the
contemporary development of other sciences.11
The second rule, requiring physical impact, verges on absurdity when such
slight injuries are allowed to satisfy it. Why should a plaintiff be allowed to re-
cover for mental distress, loss of memory, and miscarriage resulting from fright, when
she suffered a slight physical impact, and recovery be denied when such impact is
absent? This result seems illogical on its face. If the policy behind this view is to
prevent fabricated claims, the Missouri requirement of physical injury from with-
out, even though arbitrary, does give a foundation to the claim.
DONALD H. CHISHOLM
TRIAL-APPEAL BY PLAINTIFF AFTER His OWN "INVOLUNTARY" NONSUIT.
Boonville Nat. Bank v. Thompson'
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, the defendant requested the court to give a
peremptory instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence. The court
marked the instruction "given," although it was not read to the jury. Plaintiffs
thereupon took a nonsuit with leave to set the same aside. When the motion to set
the nonsuit aside was overruled by the lower court, plaintiffs appealed. Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that the nonsuit was voluntary and
hence not appealable. The Supreme Court, however, overruled this motion to dis-
miss the appeal, saying that the defendant's peremptory instruction was "given"
by the court below so that plaintiffs were precluded from recovery, and that there-
fore the nonsuit taken by plaintiffs was an involuntary nonsuit from which an appeal
would lie.
The rule followed in this case seems to be firmly established in Missouri,2
despite the fact that it creates an anomolous procedural situation. Under ordinary
11. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbances as Legal Damage (1922) 20 MIcH. L.
R. 497.
1. 99 S. IV. (2d) 93 (Mo. 1936).
2. Hageman v. Moreland, 33 Mo. 86 (1862); Layton v. Riney, 33 Mo. 87
(1862); Martin v. Fewell, 79 Mo. 401 (1883); Nivert v. Wabash R. R., 232 Mo.
626, 135 S. IV. 33 (1911); Arp v. Rogers, 99 S. W. (2d) 103 (Mo. 1936); Netzow
Mfg. Co. v. Baker, 137 Mo. App. 670, 119 S. W. 450 (1909); Bushyager v. Ham-
mond Packing Co., 142 Mo. App. 311, 126 S. NV. 985 (1910). North Carolina and
Florida also follow the Missouri view evidently on the theory that to force plaintiff
to suffer final judgment to go againt him after a ruling of the trial court which will
preclude him from recovery is a hardship on plaintiff and "a waste of time." Ala-
bama, because of statute, has reached the Missouri result in many instances. The
cases from these jurisdictions are collected in 9 ANN. CAS. 632; 3 C. J. 501.
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circumstances, a voluntary nonsuit is one which the plaintiff requests at some stage
of the trial, usually up to the time when the case is submitted to the court
or jury.3 Plaintiff, having asked to be nonsuited, cannot thereafter appeal from
the order granting the nonsuit.4 In the case of an involuntary nonsuit, which is
granted by the court either on its own motion or that of defendant (usually
because plaintiff has failed to state or prove facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action), the plaintiff may appeal from the order granting the nonsuit, and
if he suffers an adverse ruling on appeal, is free to bring another action later."
Under the ruling of the instant case, however, we have this situation: plain-
tiff puts on his case, and then upon seeing that some ruling of the court will pre-
vent him from recovering,G he is permitted voluntarily to request a nonsuit
with leave to set the same aside. When the motion to set the nonsuit aside
is made, the court ordinarily overrules it. Plaintiff then appeals from the judgment
of dismissal entered after the order overruling this motion. The appellate court in
deciding this appeal must necessarily decide the question of whether or not the ruling
which precluded plaintiff from recovery was rightfully given by the lower court. If
it decides that the ruling was correct, then plaintiff, instead of being barred from
further action (as he would have been had a judgment been entered on the adverse
ruling or a verdict brought in as a result of it) is in a position, since he has merely
been nonsuited, to bring another action on the same facts. In reality then, he is
permitted to take a voluntary nonsuit and yet have the right to an appeal, simply
because the court chooses to call a voluntary nonsuit an involuntary one.
The justification for this rule is difficult to see. The earliest Missouri decision
on the point neither cites cases in accord nor attempts to justify the rule with rea-
son.7 It merely passes the problem off with the statement that "It is only where the
action of the court, on the trial, is such as to preclude the plaintiff from a recovery
that it is proper to suffer a nonsuit. In no other case will this court interfere, as has
been decided again and again."
3. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 960. In other jurisdictions, the stage at which a
voluntary nonsuit may be taken as a matter of right varies greatly. There is an
excellent discussion and collection of cases in 18 C. J. 1153 ff.
4. Howell v. Pitman, 5 Mo. 246 (1838); Chouteau v. Rowse, 90 Mo. 191,
2 S. W. 209 (1886); Hogan-Sunkel Heating Co. v. Bradley, 320 Mo. 185, 7 S. W.
(2d) 255 (1928) . The cases holding this long-established point are collected in 3 C.
J. 501.
5. This rule, too, is established in practically every jurisdiction beyond a ques-
tion of doubt. There is a long collection of cases in 3 C. J. 497 ff.
6. The principal case decided by division two and Arp v. Rogers, 99 S. W.
(2d) 103 (Mo. 1936), decided the same day by division one, settle previous doubts
as to whether the peremptory instruction must be actually read to the jury. It
now seems clear that the court's marking of the instruction "given" is sufficient
basis for calling the nonsuit involuntary, regardless of whether the instruction was
read to the jury. See also, Wallace v. Woods, 102 S. W. (2d) 93 (Mo. 1937).
7. Hageman v. Moreland, 33 Mo. 86 (1862).
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The view of the Federal courts that such a nonsuit, being requested by the
plaintiff, is a voluntary one from which no appeal will lie, seems to be the better one.8
So strongly are the federal courts opposed to the Missouri rule that they have re-
fused to apply it in a case arising in the Missouri District Court.9 Most of the state
courts have never considered the question, seemingly because they feel that a non-
suit voluntarily requested by a plaintiff is in fact a voluntary nonsuit, and to con-
tend that it is involuntary is an absurd position.1°
Ordinarily when judgment is entered upon a verdict brought in as a result of a
peremptory instruction, that judgment is final unless reversed on appeal. Under the
rule followed in the principal case, plaintiff is not barred from further action even if
an appellate court decides that the peremptory instruction was rightfully given. He
is merely nonsuited, and may later bring another action on the same facts. The
practical effect of the rule is this: as long as plaintiff does not have sufficient facts
to allow his case to go to the jury, the defendant has no chance of getting a judg-
ment which is res judicata on the facts alleged and proved. To give such an ad-
vantage to a plaintiff appears to be unwarranted and unjust to defendant.
KIRK JEFFREY
8. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Metalstaff, 101 Fed. 769 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900);
Francisco v. Chicago & A. R. R., 149 Fed. 354 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906).
9. Francisco v. Chicago & A. R. R., 149 Fed. 354 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906).
10. Except for North Carolina, Florida, and Alabama, mentioned supra note 2,
the direct point involved in the principal case does not seem to have been discussed
by other jurisdictions.
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